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Note: Due to bad planning and some unexpected circumstances, this paper is distributed 
to the panelists much too late. Still, the paper must be considered an incomplete draft, 
something that I much regret, since the project being reported is already much on 
overtime. On the other hand, this makes your comments all the more welcome, and they 
will hopefully contribute to clarification, so that the project can be brought quickly to an 
end. — This paper relies on much joint work with the project group. As for this paper, 
the contributions of Lennart Erixon, Juhana Vartiainen, Birgir Björn Sigurjonsson and 
Bent Sofus Tranøy are particularly appreciated. 
 
Note 2004: The paper was written in 1996 for the occasion noted above. For a variety of 
reasons, a revised version was never completed. It has been referenced in a number of 
studies on Nordic political economy, and for this reason I am now making the original 
version available on the web. At TIK (Centre for technology, Innovation, and Culture at 
the University of Oslo), more work on these matters will be carried out in connection 
with projects on globalization and on varieties of capitalism. 
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Notes on social democracy 
Two groups like to invoke the notion of the decline of social democracy. Conservative 
groups, who have in the Nordic setting often been minor parties with much less 
influence than the social democrats, regularly point to the the failure of social 
democracy. Left-wing groups on the other hand, often marginalised on the far left side, 
are ambivalent: they would not mind a decline of social democracy if it led to increasing 
support for more genuine socialist politics, but as long as this is not the case, they 
lament the Golden Age of social democracy, in which everything was much better than 
now. In the international debate, there are numerous voices from scholars sympathetic 
to e.g. Sweden’s programme of a third way between capitalism and socialism, who tend 
to think that Nordic labour parties have betrayed their successful full employment 
programmes of the earlier postwar decades. 
Social democrats themselves, are manouvering each day in real life politics. 
Facing normative judgements as those above, they might well respond like Miles Davis, 
who in his older days was asked by a music journalist why he did not play the old stuff 
anymore. Reply: «Should I play like Louis Armstrong, in these clothes?» Social 
democracy also carries new clothes, and it may be hard to determine whether the choice 
of clothes was that person’s choice, or the submission to international fads and fashions. 
That kind of question has been popular in recent research on how social democracy has 
managed the economy in the relevant Nordic countries recently. 
Below, we summarize the main findings of a project on Nordic economic policies 
in the 1980s and 1990s.1 The project was not designed primarily to highlight the fate of 
social democracy, but given the importance of reformist socialism in the Nordic area, 
some of our findings may have relevance for this discussion. 
 
Some items not covered in this draft 
There is no space here to provide extensive introductory discussion of concepts, theory 
and method. A less draft-like version of this paper would at least discuss the items on 
the following list, which is presented here as a service to readers (of this draft) who are 
familiar with earlier work by the Nordic Economic Policy project. The list covers topics 
that are dealt with in Ch. 1 of the project’s final report. 
                                     
1 The Nordic Economic Policy project is the sequel to a similar project which was reported in the 
mid-1980s. The main publications were: Lars Mjøset, ed., Norden dagen derpå [Norden — the day after], 
Oslo & Copenhagen 1986. English summary: Lars Mjøset, «Nordic economic policies in the 1970s and 
1980s», International Organization, 41, 3, (Summer), pp. 403-456. A bibliography of the Nordic 
economic policy project is available in Lars Mjøset, «The influence of regulation theory on Nordic 
studies of economic policies and social development», La lettre de la régulation, No. 6, 1993. 
The present project has been supported through 1992-95 by the Joint Committee of the Nordic 
Social Science Research Councils (NOS-S). Participants have been Jan Otto Andersson, Pekka Kosonen, 
Juhana Vartiainen (Finland), Lennart Erixon (Sweden), Esben Sloth Andersen, Jesper Jespersen, Klaus 
Nielsen (Denmark), Birgir Bjørn Sigurjonsson (Iceland), and Ådne Cappelen, Jan Fagerberg, Lars Mjøset 
and Bent Sofus Tranøy (Norway).  
The present summary is based on a book length final report that will be published (in English) 
later. The project also have produced monographs on four of the five cases. The Finnish monograph was 
published by Åbo Academy in 1993, while monographs on Iceland, Norway and Sweden are published 
by the Institute for Social Research, Oslo, in 1996. 
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— Definition of an economic policy model.2 
— Presentation of the distinction between four different theoretical approaches, 
i.e. the economic policy routines and policy goals implied in these four models: the 
Rehn/Meidner, Keynesian, Scandinavian staple exports and Neoliberal models. 
— Definition of five Nordic Golden Age models. 
— Definitions of a Nordic Normative Legacy.3 
— A discussion of structural change as an additional goal, in connection with the 
neo-schumpeterian notion of «national systems of innovation». 
— Definition of internal and external pressures 
— Specification of the method of comparison: a case-oriented approach, aiming 
to uncover patterns of multiple-conjunctural causation to explain changes in economic 
policies in the Nordic area and the impact of these on the Nordic Normative legacy. 
 
 
The idealised disappointment cycle 
In our earlier studies, we traced the five relatively coherent economic policy models of 
the Golden Age (in some cases only in the 1960s), and studied the response to the world 
economic downturn of 1974/5. We found that economic policy routines were 
maintained with the expectation that the situation would soon normalize. As no such 
normalization followed, a number of unexpected consequences of economic policies 
were experienced, and a process of fumbling started. Let us label this a first 
disappointment. In this paper, we shall present a stylized account of three such 
disappointments. This implies that fumbling has been going on since the late 1970s. The 
notion of disappointment is intended as a specification of this process of fumbling or 
searching. Disappointment indicates that one pattern of fumbling has failed, and that the 
search for another solution intensifies. This produces a periodisation that not always fits 
a periodisation based on the business cycle. 
The disappointments are related to both external and internal pressures. Thus, the 
timing is not the same in each single case. In some cases, there may even be an absence 
of disappointments over a longer time span. In such cases, per definition, a new 
coherent model has emerged (cf. the cases of Denmark and Finland, below). In the 
                                     
2 Our notion of an economic policy model is an analytic concept: it refers to a coherent system of 
macroeconomic policies based on international conditions and influenced domestic processes of structural 
and institutional change. 
A model implies that there is a standardisation over time of the decisions made by economic 
policy makers, implying consensus on how to interpret events and statistics, and on what instruments to 
rely on given the interpretation of the economic situation. We shall consider a set of routines a model if 
they prevail for more than one business cycle (in the medium term sense, in which the peak to peak 
period ranges from 5 to 7 years). 
Whenever one economic policy model breaks down, one cannot be sure that a new one will 
emerge. There may be turbulent historical periods in which economic policies operate more or less via 
trial and error. We shall call this fumbling (which also implies searching and learning). In such a period, 
decision makers may well adopt to international trends of economic policy making. It is an empirical 
question whether such fumbling ever produces a new coherent model. 
3 The three goals — universal social welfare, full employment and equality — were 
institutionalized during the first postwar decades. They have also been prominent (at least on the 
programmatic level) in the institutions of Nordic intergovernmental cooperation (the Nordic council). We 
dub these goals the Nordic normative legacy. The fact that this cluster of norms have been 
institutionalised does not mean that they have been realised. Rather, it means that they exist as a pressure 
for legitimation, a constraint on political action. The discussion of the crisis of social democracy is to 
some extent a discussion of the extent to which this constraint has weakened. 
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following discussion, however, we present an idealized cycle of disappointments. In this 
stylized version, the timing is homogenous across countries.4 Inevitably, this cycle fits 
one country better than the others, and like in many studies of the Nordic counrties, 
Sweden emerges as the closest fit. The cycle also fits Norway quite well, and the cases 
of Finland, Denmark and Iceland depart more or less. 
The choice of a Sweden-based idealisation is to some extent arbitrary. We could 
have chosen Iceland is the norm, followed by accounts of how the four other cases 
deviated from that norm. The choice of Sweden, however, gives more economy to the 
presentation, as the number of similarities to the other countries multiply compared to 
the choice of Iceland. Thus, we might hint at a somewhat less relativistic interpretation 
of our stylized disappointment cycle: 
The cycle of disappointments can be seen as an attempt to idealize on the basis of 
the more general influences on economic policies, while we keep out influences relating 
to the specific features of the particular nations, features relating to their dominant 
export sectors, peculiar impact of business cycles, and possible political-institutional 
ideosyncracies. The idealised disappointment cycle traces the «path-dependence» of 
economic policies. But such a generalisation is not the goal of our study. To understand 
each specific case, we need to trace similarities and differences towards the idealised 
cycle. Only then we can understand the specific timing, and see the factors that 
influenced this timing. 
Thus, each main section below contains three subsections. The first is entitled 
generalized experiences, it traces the general features of disappointment, based on the 
experience of unexpected effects of the policy solutions of the earlier phase. Cf. the 
lower level boxes of Table 1. 
In the next subsection, we present the comparative record, investigating whether 
all the case countries really experience disappointment, and also whether there were 
cases of disappointment for different reasons than the general ones. 
Thirdly, we discuss the kind of responses that followed. These responses are the 
new economic policy strategies that produce the experiences that define the next 
disappointment. Cf. the upper level boxes of Table 1.5 
In our earlier work, we found that the relatively coherent Golden Age models got 
into trouble in the high-inflation crisis period of the mid-1970s. This first experience of 
disppointment in the late 1970s and early 1980s led to a convergence towards a Nordic 
version of neoliberalism. In this follow-up project, we study two further periods of 
disappointment. The early 1980s policy of competitiveness lead to the overheating of 
the mid- and late-1980s. In this period a norm-based policy emerged. These are 
disappointments connected to the trying out of policies with more marked-based 
(neoliberal) elements.6 Although two different versions of neoliberalism have failed, the 
disappointments have not lead to any sign of a backlash against neoliberal views.  
                                     
4 To be more presice, within the project there has been long discussions as to what kind of 
common perspective should be used to organize the final report. In this paper we try out one proposal, 
originally put forward by Lennart Erixon. 
5 Note of warning: For lack of time, I am not sure whether I have been able in this draft version to 
organise the material coherently in this fashion. For instance, I am not always able to conduct the analysis 
I promised to co in the comparaive record setions. I shall have to do some more work on this before this 
paper can be considered finished. 
6 The emergence of neoliberal views should be understood in a relative sense. The orientation of 
decision makers was more market-oriented than in the 1970s, but not as strongly neoliberal as e.g. in 
England and the U.S. We shall not here discuss the social philosophy behind this approach, but specify its 
implications for economic policies. Neoliberal views imply the following policy advices: (1) 
deregulation, (2) privatization, (3) cuts in tax and public transfers (hostility towards public sector growth; 
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The first version of the early 1980s may be seen as a national variety. It involved 
restrictive monetary policies (attempting to push up interest rates) and tight fiscal 
policies (even in the downturn of the early 1980s). Devaluations, however, often served 
to secure an expansive economic climate.7 
Unexpected consequences, such as inflation and various deficits, lead into the 
period of norm-based neoliberalism, emphasizing norm-based exchange rate policies 
(barring policy makers from the temptation to devalue) and allocative efficiency 
reforms.8 The search for closer ties with the EU might be seen as an attempt to 
consolidate this approach. 
That search was further encouraged as in the early 1990s, as it became clear that 
norm-based policies could not prevent overheating, deep economic setbacks including 
higher unemployment, and extensive financial instabilities. We shall discuss the extent 
to which a final EU-based, europeanized neoliberal approach emerges as an «external» 
solution to these problems. 
                                     
arguments relate both to crowding out and wrong incentives), (4) hostility towards special interest groups 
and corporatist arrangements, thus hostility towards incomes policies. — Such neoliberal attitudes also 
converged with the postulates of supply side economics, which is defined by its more specific statements 
on growth, investments and the capital/labour-relationship. The main point in supply side economis are: 
(1) Stabilisation policies (demand policies) have no lasting effects on production and employment (shared 
with neomonetarism as defined below). (2) Priority is given to improved static allocation of resources. (3) 
Wage formation should be improved and the supply of labour should be stimulated through reforms of 
(marginal) taxes and by deregulation of the labour market. 
7 This neoliberalism had elements of a somewhat pragmatic neomercantilism. The emphasis was 
on the value of stimulating the exposed sector, but stimulation should not be achived through protective 
tariffs or the like (in this respect, there was influence from supply side economics), but rather through 
devaluations and increased wage differentiation that benefits the exposed sector. 
8 This neoliberal approach was influenced by what we shall label neomonetarism. Main points 
were: (1) Priority to the struggle against inflation. (2) Stabilisation policies have no lasting effects on 
production and employment. (3) Firms and households must be provided with fixed rules of the game (a 
given exchange rate, a given quantity of money). 
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Table 1. The Nordic disappointment cycle  
* Keynesian 
counter-
cyclical policies 
(primarily fiscal 
policies in S, D, N; 
exchange rate 
policies and acco- 
modating fiscal and 
monetary policies in 
F, I.
* Incomes policies 
(«voluntary» in S)
* Industrial support 
(especially S)
* Ad hoc measures 
after OPEC I 
(devaluations in S 
1976-7, etc) 
* Devaluation     
policies combined 
with tight fiscal 
policies in countries 
with current 
account and public 
deficits, exclusive 
of I (S and D)
* Restrictive 
monetary policies 
(especially in D and 
expecially in the 
late part of the 
period in other 
countries) 
* Deregulation of 
domestic credit 
markets
* Norm-based policies
— Hard currency policy, 
in the end ECU-peg) 
(except I, 1985-88)
— Tight fiscal policies to 
dampen inflation
— Low inflation priority
— Ban on public 
borrowing to finance 
public budget deficits
— External deregulations
* Allocative efficiency 
reforms (marginal tax 
reforms, privatization, 
deregulation of product 
markets, public sector 
cuts)
* No monetary stabiliza- 
tion policy (tied to the 
har currency policy)
* Floating 
exchange 
rates (F, 
S, [N])
* Tight 
fiscal and 
monetary 
policies to 
reduce the 
long term 
interest 
rate by 
raising 
«confi- 
dence» 
and 
securing 
conver- 
gence to 
EMU.
Incomes 
policies (≠ N); 
Labour market 
policies
Incomes 
policies; 
Labour market 
policies
Incomes policies;
Labour market policies;
Tight fiscal policies (to dampen 
inflation irrespective of effects 
on confidence);
Low inflation priority 
(irrespective of effects on long 
term interest rates;
Allocation efficiency reforms
* High inflation (70s), 
periodically high relative 
inflation
* Current account deficits 
(D, I, S)
* Loss of market shares 
(S, D?, F?, N?)
* Profitability crisis (S, 
F?, N?, D?)
* High taxes and social 
expenditures
* Public deficits (D, S)
* Grey credit markets
* Low GDP growth
* High relative 
inflation
* Increasing 
interest rates
* Only temporary 
gains in market 
shares
* High taxes and 
social transfers
* Grey credit 
markets
* High relative 
inflation (early part 
of the period ≠ D
* Relatively low 
production growth 
[?]
* Current account 
deficits [≠N], but 
declining in D
* Higher 
unemployment, first 
in D, N
ECO-     
NOMIC 
POLICY 
ROU- 
TINES
ROUTINES SURVIVING 
FROM EARLIER 
ECONOMIC POLICY 
MODELS
EXPERIENCES FROM 
EARLIER ECONOMIC 
POLICIES
LEADING COUNTRY Sweden Finland Denmark EU
PERIOD Golden age & 1970s Early to mid-1980s Mid-80s to early 1990s Early 90s
 
 
 
First disappointment — late 1970s and early 1980s 
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According to our earlier analysis,9 the response to the international 1974-6 downturn 
implied the continued implementation of earlier routines, perhaps even — in some cases 
— more generously implemented than earlier. Thus, we do not really see 
disappointments during this crisis. Only when fumbling starts, that is during the weak 
international upturn and further during the «second slump» (1980-82), we can trace 
disappointments.  
 
Generalized experiences 
Since this period was already analysed in the earlier project, we shall just refer to Table 
1, which quotes the following problems: high inflation (sometimes even high in a 
relative sense), current account deficits, loss of market shares, a profitability crisis, high 
taxes and social expenditures, public deficits and faltering growth of GDP. 
This period of disappointment coincided with a new set of external pressures, due 
to the slump in the international economy, following the OPEC II oil shock: the 
revaluation of the USD and the connected rise in international interest rates, a higher oil 
price level, and penetration of Nordic markets by cheap manufactured goods from the 
NICs and Japan. 
 
Comparative record 
The account above fits Sweden the best. 
Swedish non-socialist governments fumbled 1979-82. A devaluation was 
conducted in 1981. Fiscal policies (including ambitious labour market policies and 
defensive industrial policies) were too expansive. Full employment was intact, but 
Sweden’s situation was quite difficult. The old model was accused of creating inflation 
and large current account deficits. Keynesian concepts (demand management, counter-
cyclical measures) were displaced by supply-side concepts such as RULC (relative unit 
labour costs) and market shares. Even the solidaristic wage policy was accused by 
Swedish economists of contributing to inflation, and the system of centralised wage 
formation was accused of creating both the mid-1970s cost crisis and too high wages in 
the exposed sector in the long run. The full employment goal, however, was not 
critisized. 
In Norway, Labour’s muddling through (1979-81) represented an attempt to 
adjust the Golden Age economic policy model under new and unfamiliar external and 
internal conditions. Certain regulatory dilemmas (in the housing sector) were unique to 
Norway, but others (grey credit markets) were similar to problems in Denmark, Finland 
and Sweden. Political effects of these problems lead to a non-socialist victory in the 
1981 elections. 
In the 1950s and 60s, Finland’s Golden Age model had been a growth oriented 
corporatism without stabilisation ambitions, thus allowing devaluation cycles. In the 
late 1970s, a growth-oriented corporatism with stabilisation ambitions emerged, 
including more Scandinavian like priorities, that is, the development of the welfare 
state, and with a more equal distribution of power between labour/capital organisations 
as a main basis. The early 1970s was a transition period, which still included elements 
of the devaluation cycle. The economic crisis of the early 1970s was a catalyst for more 
consensual economic policies. 
Apart from early disappointment in 1977 (high unemployment), Finland did not 
really experience any disappointments. The Finnish model in this period was relatively 
expansive. The routines that emerged in Finland since the late 1970s were maintained 
                                     
9 «Nordic economic policies in the 1970s and 1980s», Table 4, p. 421. 
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into the late 1980s, making the 1980s a Finnish Golden Age! Finland had no serious 
current account crisis.10 Unlike earlier, Finnish fiscal policies were no more contractive 
than Denmark’s, Sweden’s or Norway’s.11 Finland continued on the expansive path in 
1983, and there were no major government changes. 
The remaining two countries had particular problems: In Denmark, there was a 
«general feeling of crisis and disaster» in 1979-82. Performance was weak on the most 
important macroeconomic indicators. Despite the devaluation strategy since 1979 (short 
attempt to behave like the other Nordic countries), Denmark experienced the fastest 
increase in unemployment ever seen since the war. Devaluations met with increasing 
scepticism since they stepped up inflation expectations, leading to high interest rates. 
By 1982 — the worst year — Labour was in a situation where it had to pursue 
both tight monetary and fiscal policies. There was no more room for devaluations, and 
incomes policies would only work in the very long term. The public budgets had to be 
tightened strongly, and Labour could not do it. Unable to adress the challenge, the 
government resigned. The alliance Labour/Radical Liberals had dissolved. In particular 
RV required harsher measures to reduce the growing budget deficit, the escalating 
national debt, etc. 
Iceland’s economic policy model entailed very expansive policies, creating 
instability. This conforms to the generalisation that the Icelandic economy has the 
largest swings in the region. Many of the novelties introduced in economic policies 
were contradictory. No effective strategy was devised to tackle the challenge of 
reducing domestic sources of instability (sudden fall in the capelin catch, uncontrolled 
money and credit markets). Fiscal policy continued to be expansive (to 1982), and there 
were some modifications in wage indexing. Credit expansion was totally out of control 
(investment boom) despite indexation of credit terms (positive and rising real rates of 
interest). Iceland was torn between the need to tighten policies due to the challenges 
created by OPEC II, and the pressure to expand, given booming catches in 1980 and 
1981 (thus, Iceland felt positive impulses while the other countries faced deteriorating 
external conditions). 
In 1982 — when conditions improved elsewhere — there was a drastic fall in fish 
catches, declining exports, and a severe profit squeeze in the fisheries sector, while the 
rate of inflation continued to rise. (Yearly inflation rates were around 45 percent 1978/9, 
ca. 50 percent 1980-82.) The standard procedure followed: devaluation of ISK and 
reduction of price compensations promised to wage earners. Wage pressure mounted. 
Because of large debts — given profit squeeze — the fisheries sector could only tolerate 
the high real interest rates if the exchange rate depreciated with falling export prices, 
and incomes policies curbed the domestic wage-price spiral. Inflation escalated to 83 
percent in 1983. The wage-earner-biased government naturally lost the 1983-elections.  
 
 
Responses 
The emergene of neoliberal, more market-oriented approaches to economic policies was 
a main part of the response to the problems traced above. Figure 1 summarizes the 
factors behind the spread of neoliberal attitudes in Nordic economic policies.  
                                     
10 Norden dagen derpå, p. 274, arguing that one reason is possibly the structural changes analysed 
in Norden dagen derpå, Ch. 4.5.3. Also arguing (cf. Figure 4.6.2) that the countercyclical nature of 
Eastern trade was the main reason for the mild pressure on the Finnish model. 
11 Norden dagen derpå, p. 275 for a discussion of whether this was a conscious change. We argue 
that the conditions were very favourable, rather than that the model had changed: if the current account 
deficit had been larger, policies might very well have been tighter too. 
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Figure 1. The neoliberal turn compared 
NORWAY, ICELAND Shift in economics
paradigm
Economic policy
management dilemmas
More market-oriented views 
on economic policy making
More market-oriented views 
on economic policy making
DENMARK
Late 1970s Early 1980s
Economic policy
management dilemmas
Public sector expansion
Shift in economics
paradigm
SWEDEN
Economic policy
management dilemmas
Public sector expansion
Shift in economics
paradigm
More market-oriented views 
on economic policy making
Internationaliza-
tion of firms
Changes in capital/
labour relations  
 
We can trace three different causal constellations. In all of them, the paradigm shift 
among professional economists exerts influence as an intervening variable.12 In the 
cases of Norway and Iceland, the paradigm shift interacted mainly with the regulatory 
dilemmas that had evolved through the period of high inflation. In Denmark and 
Sweden, criticism of large-scale public sector expansion was an additional factor, 
reflecting larger public sectors, larger structural budget deficits and higher taxes in these 
two countries. In Sweden, finally, also the internationalisation of firms played a role, 
since it alters the balance between labour and capital in labour’s disfavour. We find that 
other possible causal factors are not of major importance, this goes for the variables 
emphasised by the power-resource approach (except the Swedish changes in the 
capital/labour-relation), and certainly for the political colour of the government. Except 
in the case of Sweden, internationaliation excerts an influence mainly through the shift 
in economics paradigm. 
Finland stands out as having no significant neoliberal turn in this period. 
Whatever there was of professional reorientation among Finnish economists had few 
practical effects, as there were no strong impact of neither regulatory dilemmas nor of 
public sector expansion. We shall discuss below how the neoliberal turn came to 
influence Finnish developments at a later stage. 
Let us now turn to the specific economic policy responses. Generalizing quite a 
bit, we find that the major response was a national neoliberalism, marked by (1) a 
policy mix in which a tight stance in monetary and fiscal policies was coupled with 
                                     
12 This should be related to the literature on the «political power of economic ideas». There is no 
space or time to do that here. 
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devaluations (the devaluation routine had been introduced somewhat earlier); (2) the 
start of a process of structural change, the internal deregulation of credit markets. 
All Nordic countries now entered a road away from Keynesianism. 
Countercyclical fiscal policy was primarily part of a strategy to stimulate the open 
sector (mainly in Sweden and Denmark), and steps were taken to disarm monetary 
policy (mainly in Denmark). To the extent that earlier Keynesian countries had any 
inclination towards generally expansive economic policies, this was not due a 
Keynesian conviction, but due to a higher degree of freedom caused by few 
macroeconomic problems (primarily Finland and Norway). The road away from 
Keynesianism became more obvious in the mid-1980s. 
Norway and Sweden increasingly followed Iceland and Finland in turning to 
devaluations (break with their earlier routines). Even Denmark did, despite its legacy of 
fear against inflation. But due to this brief and negative experience, Denmark also 
became the first to establish a hard currency approach. 
The parallells between the Finnish, Norwegian, and Swedish cases indicate the 
«Scandinavisation» of Finnish fiscal and monetary policies, together with the 
«Finlandisation» of exchange rate policies all over the Nordic region. It is possible to 
draw a distinction between coherent and incoherent models. 
In Sweden, the 1982 devaluation started off a period which seemed coherent, but 
which gave rise to major problems in the second half of the 1980s. In Norway, non-
socialist economic policies involved neutral fiscal policies, decentralisation of wage 
settlements countered by small devaluations and expansionary monetary policies, a 
constellation that could not be sustained for long. In Finland, a rather coherent model of 
economic policy making had emerged. In the case of Denmark, Labour’s approach 
before 1982 proved incoherent, but the extent to which the new approach was coherent 
did not become clear as soon as in the Finnish case.13 The Icelandic model has, in fact, 
always been a chain of more or less incohernt sequences. 
When Labour came to power in Sweden in 1982, the government launched the 
Third Way, promising to transcend both Keynesianism and Monetarism, enabling 
Labour to simultaneously reduce the structural component of the public deficit, reduce 
the current account deficit, raising investments/competitiveness and defend full 
employment.14 The 16 percent devaluation in 1982 was the main instrument of the 
strategy,15 coupled with tight fiscal policies in the 1980s recovery. The Third Way did 
not imply a changing emphasis on the various goals of economic policy. It was response 
to the problems quoted earlier: structural public deficits, massive current account 
deficits, profitability crisis, and dramatic losses of market shares in the late part of the 
1970s. Improving Swedish competitiveness by a devaluation was a way to avoid that 
current-account improvements — through deflationary policies — lead to higher 
unemployment. Thus, we dub this a nationally oriented neoliberal approach. Only in the 
                                     
13 In 1986/7, our judgement was that Finland had the only Nordic economic policy model that had 
stabilised through that early 1980s instability, Mjøset, «Nordic economic policies in the 1970s and 
1980s», p. 446. However, in retrospect, even Denmark’s search was about to lead into a more stable 
solution (one involving mass unemployment though). Strictly speaking, that period of stability started 
only after the fading of the 1985/6 boom. 
14 K. O. Feldt, Den Tredje Vägen, Stockholm 1985. 
15 Note, however, that devaluations might be seen as a Keynesian instrument to raise aggregate 
demand by lower RULC leading to higher market shares. But the 1982 devaluation was non-Keynesian in 
the sense that its expansive effects were counteracted by tight fiscal policies — the aim of this mix was to 
raise profitability and shift resources to the open sector.  
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latter half of the 1980s we find a marked break with the interventionistic Swedish 
model. 
In Norway, the new Conservative government (fall 1981) pursued public spending 
cuts, tax-relief for high-income groups, and deregulation. Two years of tight policies 
brought unemployment higher than anytime during the 1970s. The new coalition 
government (Willoch II) in June 1983 began to concern itself more with the welfare 
state and the fate of rural areas, pursuing more expansive policies. As for the policy 
mix, the main changes did not occur during the Willoch I government. Fiscal policy was 
neutral, and there were attempts to counteract expansion by tilting up the nominal 
interest rate. Willoch I acted on certain of the regulatory dilemmas, liberalising the 
housing sector,16 stimulating the stock market. In the upturn from 1983, Norway 
pursued several smaller devaluations (routinely used to «correct» competitiveness after 
decentralised bargaining), with procyclical fiscal expansion (Sweden, in contrast had 
two large devaluations, with tight fiscal and monetary policies). Norway’s monetary 
policies were expansive from 1984 and onwards. Sweden and Denmark had substantial 
problems due to the large current account deficits. Norway, however, pursued austerity 
without an external deficit. 
In Finland, the OECD structural budget balance indicator shows that fiscal 
policies were counter-cyclical in two out of three years. This signifies the 
«Scandinavisation» of Finnish economic policies. The older «cameralist» tradition in 
Finnish economic policies had been the claim that spending should match incomes from 
taxation. This kind of budgeting had now become a thing of the past.17 Monetary and 
incomes policies also proceeded according to routines, and it should also be noted that 
Finnish business cycles were quite stable. 
The resignation of the Danish Labour government in 1982 implied an opening for 
a brief neoliberal shock treatment. The Radical Liberals (RV — generally the 
moderating middle force in Parliament) switched to support the Conservative austerity 
offensive. But after a real decline in public spending 1983-4, public spending grew in 
real terms. RV reverted to its moderating role. Since 1983, the advantages of the new 
mix of exchange rate policy and wage policy (moderation achieved already during 
Labour rule) could be reaped, leading on to a boom period. 
In Iceland, a more firmly neoliberal (neomonetarist variety) government was 
inserted after the election of mid-1983. Developments 1983/4 were mainly marked by 
the interaction between exchange rate policies and incomes policies, involving very 
heavy mobilisation relating to incomes policy dictates.  
But devaluations 1982-3 were less effective as policy instruments than earlier. 
Most financial assets had now been indexed. Real interest rates were high and positive, 
and the whole economy was strongly indebted (especially the fisheries sector, due to 
large investments in freezer trawlers). Although Iceland is the smallest and most 
«deviant» (with a business cycle influenced by fish catches and prices) economy of all 
the Nordic ones, it here proves to be in an avant-garde position. The turn to high real 
interest rates came much earlier. The problem of debt deflation would strike the other 
economies, with the exception of Denmark, later. 
Let us now turn to the second feature of the response to the first disappointment, 
the internal deregulation of the financial system. We shall deal with three aspects of this 
process: 1. Lifting of quantitative restrictions (introduction of more market-oriented 
                                     
16 The differences to Sweden and Finland is analysed in our final report. 
17 Jukka Pekkarinen & Juhana Vartiainen, Suomen talouspolitiikan pitkä linja [The long line of 
Finnish economic policy], Porvoo 1993. [Revised edition and Swedish translation coming up in 1996.] 
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measures). 2. Changes in the market structure (competition policies). 3. The fact that 
there were certain adjustment lags in the relationship between structural changes and 
changes in monetary policies. 
Denmark started the internal deregulation of its financial system already in 1983, 
while Finland, Norway, and Sweden all started later. In all the countries, the 
deregulation of financial markets took place gradually. The Finnish case was extreme, 
as deregulation was never analysed seriously or even stated in any official policy 
document. But in none of the countries, parliamentary debates ever raged high over 
these issues, and the Central Bank had strong influence over the outcomes. 
Let us consider the lifting of quantitative restrictions in the mid-1980s. First, both 
Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden retained primary reserve requirements, but they 
abolished other kinds of (e.g. supplementary) reserve requirements. Second, rules as to 
how funds should be placed (such as e.g. purchases of state-issued and state-guaranteed 
bonds) were abolished. In Sweden, this happened already in the late 1970s in 
connection with the budget deficits. Third, as for the banks’ option of borrowing in the 
central bank (quotas, involving penality interest rates on overdrafts), existing systems 
were modified, being made less penalizing. The case of Denmark is special, since 
Denmark had only had such restrictions since the worsening of the current account 
problem in the late 1960s. Denmark had less barriers to deregulation than the other 
countries, whose financial systems had been tightly regulated through the whole 
postwar period. In Denmark, quantitative restrictions on bank lending, etc. were 
dismantled already 1980-82.  
Fourth, the introduction of open market operations indicated a more market-
oriented method of central bank control of the money supply. Again, Denmark deviates: 
Efforts to open up the Danish bond market in the early 1970 had failed.18 The Danish 
bond-market has always involved a vast market for secondary trading. Given the 
enormous size of this bond market, the Central Bank has little chance of influencing the 
interest rate, so in fact the Danish Central Bank had given up open market operations in 
the mid-1970s. 
In all the cases, these moves responded to the earlier emergence of financial 
institutions (although the size of the grey market was perhaps exaggerated) wholly or 
partly beyond the control of the Central Bank. Through these markets, quantitative 
restrictions could be evaded. One of the motives behind internal deregulation was to 
make the capital market work more smoothly given the early 1980s situation with 
strong current account and public deficits. (But even Norway, with no huge external 
deficit deregulated in the mid-1980s.) 
In Norway, almost all restrictions on lending had been repealed by January 1984. 
Primary reserve requirements and open market operations were then the authorities’ 
only remaining credit policy instruments. The same was the case in Sweden by 1985. In 
the Finnish case, internal deregulation had been completed with the repeal of lending 
quotas and penalty interest rate on overdrafts in the central bank by 1989. In Iceland, 
monetary control by the Central bank in the mid-1980s would be based on active policy 
rules for reserve and liquidity requirements (which allowed inflationary taxation until 
1986), penalty interest rates on overdrafts and guidelines to commercial banks. 
Let us now turn to changes in the structure of financial markets (some of which 
reflected changing competition policies). Some changes followed from changes in legal 
                                     
18 Denmark had already opened up large parts of its capital market as a consequence of the EU 
membership in 1973. But as Danish bonds had become extremely attractive, a temporary ban on the sale 
abroad of Danish government bonds had to be reintroduced in 1979. 
Nordic economic policies in the 1980s and 1990s 
15 
regulations. In 1984, Norwegian banks were left much freer to establish new branches 
and offices. Foreign banks were allowed entry at about the same time.  
Just as important are changes in the execution of existing regulations. Let us 
consider functional desegmentation. Until the mid-1980s, the Danish system had been 
marked by a specific pattern of segmentation: mortgage institutions provided credits for 
housing and business buildings, insurance companies provided all varieties of insurance 
except for pension insurance, which was taken hand of by pension funds and banks. 
Banks, furthermore, provided loans to businesses and to consumers. This division of 
labour was fixed for a long time, also implying that the largest actors in each group 
were well established. In the mid-1980s, however, this division of labour dissolved as 
regulatory practice became looser. In 1982, mortgage institutions began to compete with 
banks in the field of consumer credit. Holding companies (that had already been put up 
in order to evade quantitative restrictions in the late 1970s) owned by other financial 
institutions, engaged in new lines of business. The goal was «financial supermarkets». 
The regulating authorities, however, be it the central bank or the state, decided that the 
legislation ensuring segmentation should not be applied to these holding companies. We 
do not know whether the political level was involved, but in any case these decisions — 
even if they were made by bureaucrats — were genuinely political. The results of this 
desegmentation — credits were extended very liberally in the middle of the 1980s — 
led to a difficult learning process for Danish monetary authorities, for the politicians, 
and for the financial sector. 
Regulation may also take the form of self-regulation, without state involvement. It 
has been argued that an important preface to the Norwegian banking crisis was a change 
in practices within the banking community (the emergence of a competition-/efficiency 
discourse; independent responsibility for a profitable result at the branch level), 
increasing interbank competition as well as competition between banks and other 
finance institutions. Such changes in the internal management strategy were not 
matched by more coordination by the head offices of the banks. The major result was an 
increased willingness to take risks. The same applied in Finland and Sweden. 
Finally, particularly in Norway and Iceland, there was in addition privatisation — 
or reorganisation — of financial institutions earlier run by the state.  
Let us consider adjustment lags, more specificlly, the timing of internal 
deregulation relative to certain other economic policy measures. As various restraints 
and quotas earlier used to regulate the credit volume were cancelled, one would expect 
that the determination of the interest rate (the price of credit) should immediately be left 
to the same market forces. However, in several of the cases, regulations still allowed the 
central bank to determine the interest rate. Thus, in Norway, there was an «interrim» 
period in which the interest rate was still an administered price. [The cases of Sweden 
and Finland must be checked.] This was one of the factors behind the persistence of 
negative real interest rates. In Denmark, Central Bank influence over the interest rate 
only extends to the money market interest rate, and to interest rates that are charged by 
the banks. The real interest rate never became negative. There was nothing like the 
Norwegian interregnum of low interest rates, although the Central Bank allowed more 
accomodating monetary policies through the first years of the Conservative-led 
government. As for Iceland, most financial assets were indexed in the early 1980s, due 
to its hyperinflation experience. It seems, however, that not even a positive real interest 
rate could barr the many options for expansive credit policies (state support and 
manipulation of various catch and price-regulation funds). 
In Finland, the timing of liberalisation was ill conceived. Central bank control 
over the interest rate was ceased in 1986, following a strong boom, while at that time 
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most economists did forecast a slowdown of the economy. Furthermore, the private 
banks’ cartel on the deposit side had not yet been dismantled (similar in Norway and 
Sweden). This ensured a steady flow of cheap deposit funds for the banks in the late 
1980s, while they were already able to channel these funds into more high-yielding and 
risky investments. 
Another important element of inertia was the absence of tax reforms in the period. 
In all the countries major changes in the tax-system came only in the late 1980s. Fiscal 
incentives such as tax deductibility of mortgage interest payment were still generous 
before that. By leading to negative post-tax real interest rates, these incentives 
encouraged further indebtedness. 
This summary indicates that in matters of internal financial deregulation, 
Denmark was a pioneer, while Iceland and Finland were laggard. This pattern also 
comes out when we consider external deregulation. Denmark made the turn to a hard 
currency line already in 1982, much earlier than the others. To bolster the credibility of 
the hard currency approach, it was decided to relax the remaining restraints on foreign 
capital flows. In May 1983 all transactions in bonds and shares — in and out of the 
country — were permitted and firms were allowed to borrow unconditionally abroad. 
The final restraints on residents’ options of buying financial assets in other countries 
were lifted on January 1, 1984. Further liberalization of currency restrictions on June 1, 
1985, implied that all financial assets traded on the stock exchanges were given free. 
Finally, in 1988, firms and households could freely chose whatever currency they 
wanted to use for their financial operations.19 In each of these steps, Denmark was 
ahead of the other Nordic countries. There were a few early moves also in the other 
countries, but the main decisions came in the latter part of the 1980s, relating to the 
second disappointment. 
Adjustments through the early 1980s crisis led the way into a major boom period 
in all the countries. The mid-80s contains a major paradox: the strongest postwar 
consumtion boom occurred during a decade of anti-Keynesian proclamations about 
holding back both private and public consumption in favour of private savings and the 
exposed sector. 
The mid-1980s involved several external stimuli: The international recovery 
generated by Reagan’s deficits immediately favoured the raw materials industries, in 
Sweden, as in Finland and Norway. Revaluation of the dollar implied advantages for 
Nordic wood producers and Swedish car companies in their competition with North-
American producers. As for producers whose products were invoiced in dollars (e.g. 
wood pulp, oil), the rising dollar implied rising profit margins. There were both instant 
and delayed multiplier effects from export boom. In Norway, exports and industrial 
production picked up, and increasing oil revenues before 1986 enabled the Conservative 
governments to pursue tax cuts and stimulation of the stock market. 
As for Sweden, the export boom continued through to the late 1980s. Rising 
demand pushed prices up, compensating the declining dollar from 1986. In addition, the 
international investment boom benefited Swedish engineering industries. The 
combination of high capacity utilisation and high profits boosted private investment 
demand, which was also spurred by deregulation of credit markets. The recovery was 
strengthened by devaluations, especially in Sweden, plus favourable terms of trade 
(Sweden & Finland), and by the construction of currency baskets (Sweden followed the 
dollar down in the late 1980s). 
                                     
19 Peter Erling Nielsen, «Danmark», in Marianne Stenius, ed., Penningpolitik i Norden, Lund 
1987. 
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Through the 1980s, various Icelandic governments tried to apply the neoliberal 
guidelines earlier written into the EMA-programme. Monetary and credit policies were 
designed to keep real interest rates high enough to stabilise the domestic credit market 
with a view to opening markets for international competition and free flows of capital, 
which was then believed to be the precondition for a stable exchange rate regime. 
Iceland experienced very harsh economic policy measures 1983-4, but external 
conditions turned favourable in 1985-7. With favourable terms of trade trends 1986-7, 
money flowed into the economy, so the commercial banks found no rationale for 
restrictive behavior.  In Iceland, higher export prices and good cod catches spurred a 
new investment boom in the indebted fisheries sector, despite high rates of interest. 
However, before any significant moves towards financial deregulation had been made, a 
new external shock destabilised the Icelandic model. 
In Norway, internal deregulation lead to unprecedented credit explosion due to 
repressed demand for loans and competitive lending by banks, also fueled by large short 
term capital inflows in 1982-4. Private consumption exploded between 1984 and 1986. 
Full employment was attained in 1986, but with a large deficit on the current account 
and unsustainable household behavior. Household savings went negative, real estate 
prices increased by a factor of 1.5 through the period 1980-87. Monetary policies were 
highly procyclical. There was also a dynamic relationship between non-intervention in 
incomes settlements, devaluations and absence of wage moderation. It was realised that 
the lowering of (marginal) tax rates had quite small effects on wages. Thus, the Willoch 
II government conducted many small devaluations, adjusting external to internal price 
developments. These devaluations would modify the results of wage settlements. Fiscal 
policies seemed to have played no major role here. 
Swedish economic policies had changed since the 1970s. At that time, generally 
expansive fiscal policies would serve to lift Sweden out of the crisis, while ad hoc 
measures (devaluations) were used to control the negative effects on the current 
account. In the 1980s, in contrast, other instruments than expansive Keynesianism were 
used to get Sweden out of the crisis, while countercyclical policies (read: restrictive 
fiscal policies) were used to avoid overheating and sustain the transfer of resoruces to 
the open sector. Keynesianism was not offensive anymore. Furthermore, serious 
attempts to cool down the economy were not made until the late 1980s. Sweden 
succeeded during the second half of the 1980s to maintain full employment despite less 
emphasis on labour market policies. 
Deregulation, together with high growth of real wages and increasing working 
time (in contrast to most other OECD countries), spurred Sweden’s private consumption 
boom in the second half of the 1980s. As a consequence, employment in the private 
service sector increased its share of total employment. Fiscal policies were not 
restrictive enough to contain the overheating tendencies in the 1980s. Moreover, the 
export sector did still flourish due to an international investment boom and favourable 
terms of trade effects for the wood industries. The Third Way boiled down to a 
combination of devaluation and incomes policies. By the mid-1980s, Sweden’s Third 
Way celebrated as a success. But the devaluation strategy interacted with external events 
to generate a wage drift/wage compensation process. But both the government and the 
central trade union movement lost control over wage formation in the late 1980s.20 
                                     
20 Thus, in the late 1980s, the non-socialist parties turned from reluctant admiration to criticism of 
The Third Way, which was now blamed as the main cause of the «speculation and casino economy» 
which was again the root of the 1990s economic crisis. But there are no indications that a non-socialist 
government would have been able to apply restrictive measures any earlier than Labour did. Furthermore, 
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As for Denmark, its policies were particularly austere in 1983-4. But then 
followed booming years, with high GDP-growth 1984-6. Despite the hard currency 
commitment since 1982, monetary policies were relatively expansive since 1983. 
Except this, all policies were tight. The general idea was that reduced inflation would 
lead to increased private sector employment, a reduced public deficit («crowding in» via 
tight fiscal policies), and a balanced current account. The two deficits (public and 
external) would be managed, even with a fixed exchange rate. 
The Danish budget balance turned to surplus in 1986, much faster than expected. 
Incomes policies towards the public employees was successful, and above all tax-
pressure was simply increased (against the promise of the government). However, the 
government failed to correct the current account deficit. Consumer demand adapted 
much faster than expected to the falling (real) interest rates and increasing personal 
wealth. There was a credit boom similar to the other Nordic countries, due to 
deregulation and desegmentation. Funds returning from the grey financial markets 
spurred booming demand for credit. As domestic demand accellerated and the savings 
rate declined 1985-6, private consumption (catching up from a major slump in 
consumption 1980-82), production, enmployment, and property prices grew in this 
optimistic «Schlüter boom». Thus, despite the international upturn and terms of trade 
improvements in 1985/6, there was a record currenct account deficit, as imports of 
consumer goods surged. On the positive side, this reduced unemployment somewhat. 
Growth of employment in the manufacturing sector was high by international standards, 
investments soared, and competitiveness (ULC) increasedy by 20 percent. 
 
 
 
Second disappointment — mid-1980s 
 
Can the mid-1980s be seen as a period of disappointment? Unlike the two other 
disappointment periods (Table 1), this was a boom period (as we saw above), not a 
period of economic crisis. The early 1980s disappointment went together with an 
international slump, and the problems of the early 1990s again emerged in a situation of 
economic crisis. This difference may explain why the disappointments of the mid-1980s 
seem to appear in a gradual way. 
 
Generalized experiences 
According to Table 1, the following problems were felt: high relative inflation, 
increasing interest rates, gains in market shares turn out to be only temporary, high 
taxes and social transfers, and grey credit markets. (Note that out of these problems, 
four of five are the same as in the first period of disappointment.) As for the 
international business cycle, there was the first out of two cyclical peaks, the latter came 
in the late 1980s, and there was no major crisis inbetween, but while the first was 
mainly based on a US boom, the latter also included a general European boom. In late 
1985 and 1986, there was the oil price slump and the «soft landing» (devaluation) of the 
dollar. As for structural changes, the deregulation of international credit and currency 
markets at that time began to be generalised in Western Europe. 
There seems to be two ways in which disappointment can be understood in the 
mid 1980s. Although a gradual transition, there was a switch from the national to the 
                                     
the non-socialist critique obscured the fact that already Labour had moved towards the norm-based 
approach.  
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norm-based version of neoliberalism. This switch was based on the realisation that the 
national variety no longer works, and particularly the new view that devaluations did 
not spur competitiveness. The term norm-based policy indicates a non-accomodating 
policy, in contrast to discretion. Secondly, as we have already indicated, in all the 
countries, investment and consumption booms led to problems of overheating 
(including regulatory problems w.r.t. the credit volume), and related problems of 
achieving wage moderation (regulatory problems in the area of incomes policies). It was 
gradually realised that consumption booms and asset price inflation were symptoms of a 
failure of economic policy management. The problems led policymakers not just to 
pursue a hard currency line (that is, joining Denmark, the avant garde in this respect), 
but also to implement tax reforms, and other allocation efficiency reforms, as we shall 
see later. 
Let us first consider the mid-1980s booms. While Iceland’s political economy has 
been used to dramatic swings, including consumption booms when times are good, 
economic development had been more stable in the other Nordic countries. Through the 
1980s, however, all of them experienced both consumption and investment booms of a 
greater magnitude than ever since the Golden age (with the possible exception of the 
investment boom of 1973-4). These booms lead to huge increases in the value of assets 
such as houses and shares.  
Table 2 synthesizes information on the growth of real private consumption 
expenditure and net household savings rates. 
 
Table 2. Dating of consumption booms 
 
 D F I N S 
Above OECD-average growth 
of real private consumption 1985-6 1986-9 1985-7 1985-6 1986-7 
Strong decline of  
savings rate 1985-6 1988 1987 1985-6 1987 
Negative savings 
rate Not ever 1988-9 A lot 1985-8 1987-90 
 
Consumption boom years 1985-6 1988-9 1985-7 1985-6 1986-7 
 
Source: OECD, Economic Outlook. 
 
Through the 1980s, in all the countries, stock markets recovered and grew more 
important than earlier (again Denmark may be an exception). The liberalisation of the 
stock market — interacting with the deregulation of the capital market — involved 
increased volumes and prices, increased ability to back bank loans with these securities, 
which in part went back into the stock market, which increased prices further, 
generating a spiralling development. The combination of a distorted tax system, high 
marginal taxes, and relatively high inflation explain the propensity to borrow. 
Borrowing was also stimulated by a feeling of everlasting good times, spreading in the 
long recovery/peak sequence from 1983 onwards. The lending explosion amplified the 
effects of exchange rate devaluation on stock market prices. The negative real effects 
and the instabilities created by this boom were not seen until the late 1980s.  
Table 3 contains some rough information on share index numbers. 
 
Table 3. Two stock exchange booms of the 1980s 
 
Share price index doubles Consumption Share price index  Start of 
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 Early 1980s booms doubles — Late 1980s decline 
 
D 1981-83 (2 years)    
 1982-85 (3 years) 1985-6 1987-91 (4 years) 1992 
F [Data missing] 1988-9 1985?-89 (4 years) 1990 
N 1982-84 (2 years) 
 1983-85 (2 years) 1985-6 1988-90 (2 years) 1991 
S 1981-83 (2 years)   
 1982-84 (2 years) 1986-7 1986-88 (3 years) 1989 
 
Source: Nordic Yearbook of Statistics, various volumes. 
 
We see that towards the end of the early 1980s downturn, there was a major surge 
of share prices. This boom faltered at about the time the consumption booms caught on. 
In Denmark and Norway, the consumption booms fits nicely inbetween two stock 
market booms, and the second, late 1980s stock market boom coincides with a 
tightening of policies. In Finland and Sweden, the late 1980s stock market boom 
overlaps with the consumption booms, that is, the stock market boom is part of a pattern 
of overall expansion. (Internal financial deregulation is simultaneous with consumption 
boom more than with the share price boom.) 
These nuances regarding timing, however, do not disturb the general conclusion 
here: unprecedented consumption and investment booms contributed to the overheating 
of all the Nordic economies. 
 
 
Comparative record 
Differences in the timing of consumption and investment booms were discussed above. 
There are significant differences in the economic development of the Nordic countries 
in the latter half of the 1980s. Norway and Finland may be seen as extremes: In Finland 
there is a feeling of everlasting good times, as the economic policy strategies have not 
met with any disappointments since the late 1970s. Norway, on the other hand, now 
became the victim of its dependence on oil: the combined oil price/dollar slump in the 
winter of 1985/6, immediately reversed the external conditions of the Norwegian 
economy. It became clear that Norway’s business cycle was now more influenced by 
the oil price and the dollar exchange rate than by the Western European cycle. One of 
the external factors that created problems for Norway lowered energy costs, thereby 
improving the situation for Sweden and Finland, but — surprisingly perhaps — not for 
Denmark. Sweden is thus closer to the Finnish case, while Denmark is closer to the 
Norwegian case. 
As for Finland, the 1979-88 period was the economically most successful decade 
in Finnish history. Having been carried lightly through the 1980-82-recession, Finland 
benefitted from the Western OECD-based recovery in the mid-1980s. A good bit of 
luck helped keep the economy on a stable growth path during almost a decade. There 
were no major disputes over economic policies. Inflation gradually came down, 
unemployment stayed at 5 percent, and terms of trade improvements counteracted 
balance of payments problems (despite faster growth than in the OECD area). Monetary 
policies were tight, incomes policies non-conflictual, and devaluations absent. There 
was no mid-1980s disappointment. Both external financial deregulation and 
consumption boom/overheating mainly belong to the late 1980s. 
In 1986, external and internal developments weakened Norway’s non-socialist 
government. With the reverse oil price shock, they were forced to pull the breaks, while 
the rest of the West European economies could continue their upturn. Failure to 
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implement a tax reform and loss of control over credit policies were main criticisms by 
the OECD. 
But even Denmark experienced disappointment in 1985/6. The current account 
deficit exploded, GNP growth stagnated, while the rest of OECD-Europe grew at 
around 3 percent. Employment also stagnated. Danish firms lost market shares both in 
the domestic market and in international markets. 
There were certain differences in the mechanisms behind the consumption and 
credit booms. As for the housing sector, real estate prices accellerated in the mid-1980s 
in all the countries. It seems, however, that Norway is the only country (among our five) 
in which the deregulation of housing rents played a major political role. This regulatory 
dilemma rooted in the high inflation, which created large discrepancies between two 
segments of the housing market, that is between the cooperative segment (with 
regulated prices) and the private segment (where owners could reap inflation gains).21 
The Willoch government’s deregulation led to soaring demand in the housing market in 
the mid-1980s, and similarly to demand for loans, since rules of tax deductibility for 
mortgage payments were still unchanged. The boom spread also to other kinds of 
property. This contributed to a spiral of increasing security values, increased borrowing 
capacity, increased credit volume (and consumer spending and inflation), increased 
housing prices, even higher security values, and so on. Although deregulation was less 
extensive, similar wealth effects were felt in Finland and Sweden’s private housing 
markets. 
In Denmark, there were no such effects, only regular business-cycle-related peaks 
in housing/property prices (1976-9 and 1983-6). Possibly the above mentioned 
increased financial competition through desegmentation increased the borrowing 
capacity of households. The increased liquidity position by firms and household 
together with the lower rate of interest increased the demand for bonds, shares and 
houses and caused asset prices to rise. But in Denmark, this only lead to a once and for 
all adjustment of private sector portfolios. Because of previous credit rationing, private 
wealth had become too illiquid and probably also too high, due to forced savings. As 
capital market restrictions were lifted, both effects were counterbalanced by heavy 
borrowing and for a while by a very low saving ratio in the household sector. There was 
however no vicious circle as in Norway, Sweden and Finland. 
 
 
Responses 
According to Table 1, the response in the late 1980s consisted in a turn to norm-based 
policies, consisting of (a) hard currency policy (leading finally to the ECU-peg); (b) 
tight fiscal policies to dampen inflation; (c) a low inflation priority; (d) a ban on public 
borrowing to finance public budget deficits, (e) external deregulation. Furthermore, the 
response entailed allocative efficiency reforms (marginal taxes, privatization, 
deregulation of product markets, public sector cuts), and an absence of stabilisation-
oriented monetary policies (since the interest rate would now support the exchange rate 
only). 
As already noted, Norway and Denmark faced severe setbacks from 1986, while 
in Finland and Sweden, the upturn continued with escalating overheating well into the 
1991. This also implied, as we shall see, that the Finnish and Swedish responses were 
more closely linked to the question of EU-membership that what is the case with 
                                     
21 Jan Fagerberg, Ådne Cappelen, Lars Mjøset & Rune Skarstein, «The Decline of Social 
Democratic State Capitalism in Norway», New Left Review, 181, May/June 1990, pp. 60-94. 
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Norway. Because of its dependence on fish-catches, Iceland has its own slump 
inbetween Norway/Denmark (from 1986), and Finland/Sweden (from 1990). 
This diversity of developments in the late 1980s is reflected in the 
macroeconomic indicators: Norway’s current account (and Denmark’s somewhat later) 
turn into surplus, while Finland and Sweden record increasing deficits. Finland, Iceland 
and Sweden have full employment and tight labour markets, while Denmark and 
Norway experience increasing unemployment. Finland and Sweden, finally, have high 
growth rates of real GDP, whereas Denmark, Iceland and Norway have relatively low 
rates. 
Denmark had maintained a hard currency line from even earlier, that is from late 
1982. The first to follow Denmark was Iceland, which maintained a fixed exchange rate 
regime from April 1985 to February 1988 with only small exchange rate adjustments. 
In Norway, policy makers embarked on a hard currency line after the May 1986 
devaluation. Until 1990, the currency was pegged to a basket reflecting the composition 
of exports. (A currency basket does not as such prevent a depreciation of the value of 
the currency, so the effects of such as basket depend on the attitudes of the regulating 
authorities.) 
In Finland, the currency was pegged to a basket from 1987, and even before, 
Finland had not resorted to devaluations as often as earlier. A main motive was to 
reduce inflation. In Sweden, the hard currency line emerged gradually as overheating 
and above-average inflation became manifest. The hard currency policy signalled that 
the government would no longer resort to devaluation. The Labour government made 
this adjustment long before the conservative government of 1991 made it their main 
pride. The final stage in this adjustment follows as these countries — again following 
Denmark’s earlier move — replaces the basket-peg with an ECU-peg. 
Emphasising internal pressures, the choice of a fixed exchange rate can be seen as 
a way to signal an anti-inflationary intention in a situation where (1) neoliberal policies 
(helped by declining oil prices) had pushed inflation down everywhere (solving some of 
the regulatory dilemmas), but (2) the Nordic countries — unlike earlier — experienced 
inflation rates above the OECD-average. The hard currency decision was an attempt to 
escape a vicious circle in which devaluations and above-average inflation fed each 
others. The case of Iceland — in an extreme way — highlights the impact of domestic 
concerns with inflation. 
The fixed exchange rate also had an external political dimension through its 
relationship to the EU project. The fixing of exchange rates was a trend all over 
Western Europe, being connected to the EU attempt to get a «process of state 
formation» on the rails. This implied a fixed exchange rate as a preparation for its EMU. 
However, the choice of a hard currency line took place in 1986-7, at a time when the 
EUs new integration offensive was just starting. The craze about the internal market and 
EMU comes later. Thus, in the 1986-9-period, we have a norm-based version of 
neoliberalism, as distinguished from the later more europeanized version of 
neoliberalism. When the internal market craze had become a reality, however, it became 
an additional factor used to defend the hard currency line. 
Iceland’s brief hard currency episode had started in a year of good catches, but as 
soon as there was a huge drop in export prices, putting the squeeze on fishery profits, 
the government was under strong pressure from fisheries interests, and gave up the hard 
currency line. A new sequence of devaluations started in early 1988. 
As for monetary policies, the trend towards a higher interest rate continued. With 
the coming of a hard currency line, the question concerning the relation between a fixed 
exchange rate and the interest rate level came up. In retrospect, most commentators 
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agree that through the 1980s, a higher interest rate was inevitable. Internal deregulation 
— as analysed above — mainly affected arrangements that had been designed to secure 
a low interest rate. 
Pegging the currency in this way, so goes the standard argument, makes the 
interest rate a dependent variable, a function of the defence of the exchange rate. Thus, 
earlier policy autonomy — the possibility of adjusting the interest rate to pursue 
domestic stabilisation — has been lost. It is often said that this is inevitable because of 
the existence of free capital flows. We have indicated that the hard currency decision 
came prior to deregulation of capital controls. Thus, such an exchange rate strategy does 
not necessarily require external deregulation; a government may peg the currency to 
some external anchor even if capital controls are not fully dismantled.  
However, even if de jure deregulation came late, the external pressure 
interpretation can point to an earlier process of de facto deregulation. There was a trend 
towards freer capital flows even before the hard currency decision. The roots of this 
goes back to changes in the world financial system: the deregulation offensives in the 
U.S. and the U.K., the explosive growth of Eurocurrency markets, and the new 
communications revolution, the monetary instability of the early 1970s leading to the 
breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, which again spurred the spread of financial 
innovation to hedge against exchange rate changes (thereby possibly adding to 
exchange rate instability). Together, these factors created what has been dubbed «casino 
capitalism». 
In all the Nordic countries, except for Iceland, local firms got increasingly 
internationalised. The need for international payments increased, and a drawn out, 
piecemeal process started: Earlier it was hard for persons and firms to get an allowance 
to trade in foreign currency markets. Now, the authorities began to grant an increasing 
number of exceptions from these regulations. It is also reasonable to assume that the 
authorities made a habit of complying with the wishes of business actors seen as crucial 
currency earners. Applicants probably experienced that their requests for more and 
more freedom were granted. Then followed a period through which it was still 
necessary to apply, but all applications were granted. Then, finally, the specific capital 
flow was made totally free, first maybe for some kinds of firms. Then again possibly a 
reversal, but finally a full liberalisation.  
At certain points in this process there may also have been conflicts, as large firms 
began to pursue strategies which made it increasingly difficult to maintain credit and 
exchange controls. As for Sweden, there was already for a long time de facto absence of 
capital controls with respect to the transactions between the units of Swedish 
multinationals. In the 1980s, these companies increasingly relied on their foreign units, 
i.e. the share of foreign production compared to exports from Sweden increased. The 
development of foreign financial channels and financial institutions within companies 
resulted in strong capital mobility between Sweden and other countries even before 
deregulations. All large firms could affect capital movements by changing the date on 
which export incomes were taken home, foreign suppliers were payed, etc. 
Multinationals could also influence the transactions between foreign and domestic units 
(transfer pricing, etc.). Single financial decisions by multinationals and large wood 
companies could pressure the SEK. 
The weight of these factors probably varied according to the economic structure 
of each country. As for the Nordic area, this implies that it was at its strongest in 
Sweden, also quite strong in Finland, but weaker in Norway, Denmark and (especially) 
Iceland. 
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Finally, other crucial economic actors, such as the state and the banks affected the 
process by joining the bandwagon. The reforms were all of the muddling through kind. 
There was no master plan: besides the wish to grant firms easier access to financing 
abroad, the authorities found the prospect of simplification attractive, and there was the 
banks’ wish to operate more independently in foreign markets. Most likely, networks 
between the management of large firms, top civil servants and central bankers were 
influential, and there may be specific paradigms for understanding socio-economic 
mechanisms. Thus, in this specific context, these networks and shared understandings 
may have bolstered a connection between the hard currency line and free capital flows. 
The end result was that to a much larger extent than earlier, the Nordic economies 
were now integrated into an international financial system (daily volumes are much 
larger counted as a share of the currency reserves) and, consequently, that their 
exchange rate policy has become more vulnerable for the capital movements conducted 
by speculators. 
More specifically, freeing of capital flows has these aspects: 
Freer access to international currency markets. The first elements of such 
deregulation may be granted to banks, then to firms, later they may be extended to 
private persons. Dismantling of currency restrictions implies the abolition of any roof 
on the amount of currency that can be exported. This implies, more generally, free 
exchange of currencies.  
Deregulation of credit controls (including trade in various securities). Residents 
are allowed to buy assets in other countries (foreign investment), and non-residents are 
allowed to buy various local assets, including national treasury bonds. This 
liberalisation may take place in stages, as limits are made more generous, and more and 
more types of assets are excluded from controls.  
The role of state borrowing abroad. If inflation/devaluation expectations exist, 
then foreign investors will only place their funds in a given country provided they earn a 
risk premium. There is one way to relieve this upwards pressure on the interest rate. The 
authorities of the country or its private sector may themselves borrow abroad, agreeing 
to pay back in a foreign (and more credible) currency. In this way, they will pay lower 
interest rates (compared to loans in their own currency), but on the other hand, they now 
have to carry the currency risk themselves. Norway and Sweden has at certain times 
practiced the state-based version, Denmark probably used the residents-based version a 
lot. Norway and Sweden, however, now banned this option (but Sweden allowed it 
again when the SEK began to float downwards in 1992). 
In the 1986-90-period, Norway and Denmark moved towards austerity, Iceland 
switched from expansionary to extremely tight economic policies, while Finland and 
Sweden did not conduct tight enough economic policies to contain the overheating of 
their economies. 
As already noted, Norway and Denmark both had downturns related to factors 
that put them apart from the main trends of the world economy. As a consequence of the 
reverse oil price shock, Norway's current account deficit remained at about 5 percent of 
GNP 1986-88. 
In Norway, the Labour government’s «turning operation» involved a 12 percent 
devaluation (May 1986), followed by a hard currency line (exchange rate policies), 
tighter fiscal policies (a Keynesian move with respect to the international upturn), tax 
reform, tight monetary policies, and finally, direct intervention in incomes settlements. 
Monetary policies, thus, were linked to the defence of the NOK, and this prevented the 
nominal rate of interest from declining along with inflation. As a consequence, both the 
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real rate of interest and the difference in real interest rates between Norway and other 
countries increased markedly.  
Internal conditions were difficult in Norway. The effects of overheating were still 
felt, especially the labour market remained quite tight. The devaluation of had been 
decided close to the peak of the business cycle, so capacity utilization was high, and 
there were not many resources to pull over into exposed sectors. Inflation in 1986 and 
1987 proved much higher than the OECD average. As the effects of the policy changes 
gradually spread through the economic system, full recession followed by 1988. At that 
time, the banking crisis also broke loose. (The analysis of the banking crisis, however, 
is postponed to the next section, since similar crises occurred in Sweden and Finland 
later). 
In Denmark, the crisis was due to internal factors: we have already seen that a 
grave current account deficit developed in connection with Denmark’s mid-1980s 
overheating. The deficit reached 5 percent/GDP, with external debt at 40 percent in 
1986. There was a pressure on the DKK, and the interest rate was very high. 
Unemployment increased, despite a reduction of working time. Growth was lowered 
due to a squeeze on the domestic market. The Danish government responded by tight 
policies, the socalled potato cure. Restrictions, especially on mortgage borrowing, were 
reintroduced. In addition, tax deductibility of interest payments was significantly 
reduced. The financial bonanza was brought to a halt, simultanously with the emergence 
of a domestic recession implying falling prices in the housing sector. A tax reform was 
implemented in 1987. Strictly speaking, therefore, it is only since 1986/7 that we can 
trace a coherent model of economic policy making in Denmark, although this model 
includes several routines that had been established alredy after 1982. Besides the tax 
reform, there was stronger emphasis on structural policies, mainly institutional reform 
(of the public sector particularly), and micro-allocation politics (industrial policies). 
While Denmark had long experienced high unemployment, the Norwegian turn to 
higher unemployment can be studied as an unforeseen consequence of the austerity 
cure. Possibly, Labour policy makers held that given the tight labour market, a higher 
level of unemployment was needed as part of the turning operation. But Labour elites 
did not expect the turning operation to legitimate layoffs on a broad scale. But 
unemployment rose from 2 percent (annual average) in 1987, to about 5 perc ent in 
1989 and 1990, the largest jump in postwar Norwegian history. The Labour government 
was quick to apply active labour market policies, these measures increased more rapidly 
than in 1982-4. But firms simply abandoned any strategy of labour hoarding, laying off 
a number of allegedly superflouos workers. In 1988, for the first time since international 
instability spread in the early 1970s, Norwegian employment started to decline. 
Norway’s «turning operation» can be compared with Denmark’s «potato cure». 
Both involved a hard currency commitment, tighter fiscal policies, and reform of the 
personal income tax system. Monetary policies were tight, but in Denmark more 
market-driven than in Norway. Norway had direct intervention in incomes policies, 
while in Denmark, there was nothing of that. Danish incomes policies 1987 turned out 
relatively generous, as the «cure» had already changed the behavior that had generated 
the consumption boom. In both Norway and Denmark, the welfare state was still 
defended. In Denmark, there was no deterioration in the welfare state benefits through 
this period. Following some minor cuts in benefits in 1983/85, there has been little 
change, except for some minor upgradings. 
There was a general world economic upturn through this period: International 
demand was growing, with favourable effects for traditional Noric export sectors. Oil 
prices also picked up towards the end of the 1980s, with positive effects on both 
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Norway and Denmark. Norway’s external balance improved to roughly balance in 1989. 
Thus the government embarked on more expansionary fiscal policies in late 1989, 
trying to halt the growth of unemployment. 
Also in Denmark, there was a relation to oil production. Danish oil and gas 
production gained pace in the mid-1980s, just when prices started to slump. Still, by the 
early 1990s, Denmark had become 90 percent self-sufficient in energy. The current 
account deficit withered away. Conditions in the domestic market (construction and 
private consumption) — the market which has traditionally been the growth engine of 
the Danish economy — improved a lot. Thus, there was less restraint on fiscal policies 
in the early 1990s. 
In Finland, the situation remained idyllic. Following the revaluation of FIM in 
March 1989, Finland surpassed Norway and Sweden in terms of income per capita! But 
problems were now accumulating. Overheating was indicated by the household 
propensity to save, which went down to 1-3 percent for the years 1988-89. The current 
account deficit was about 5 percent of GDP in years 1989-1991, as a legacy of 
overheating. Perhaps the most telling indictor is the annual growth in the banks’ loans 
(nominal) portfolio, which was 30 percent in 1988 alone — a token of financial 
overheating and the credit-driven bubble. Having escaped economic instability since the 
late 1970s, Finland was ripe for a most severe disappointment. 
As noted, Sweden’s Third Way policy basically amounted to the 1982 devaluation 
and the 1982-5 incomes policy. Too loose fiscal policies, and deregulation of credit 
markets in a situation with an unreformed tax system, are the most important factors 
behind the problems created by the Third Way approach. These factors explain the lack 
of renewal and productivity growth in Sweden’s established manufacturing firms in the 
1980s. After this attempt to stay unique, interventionist policies were given up, and the 
economic policy priorities of the Swedish model were changed. The view that 
competitiveness could be raised by devaluation was scrapped. It was feared that 
international capital markets would loose all confidence in the SEK (with higher interest 
rates as a consequence), while labour market agents would expect further devaluations, 
internalising this expectation in their wage claims. Any kind of expansive economic 
policy was ruled out. Some economists even started to attack the last element of 
interventionism: labour market policies were seen as inflationary (at least its demand 
components) just like any other expansionary policy. The main arguments refered to 
international capital markets, and the consolidation of inflation expectation among 
labour market partners. 
Deregulations and cuts in taxes on work and profits together with cuts in public 
transfers were the most striking characteristics of the new policy. Furthermore, norm-
based exchange rate policies were gradually introduced, starting 1985-6. In fiscal 
policies, there were countercyclical ambitions about avoiding overheating. 
This policy turn lead to more serious tensions than ever between Labour and LO 
in this period. After a while, LO could see redistributive effects, such as the stock 
market booms, wage drift for white collar workers, social expenditure cuts, etc. As an 
alternative, LO economists supported a strategy of continuous devaluations (continued 
Third Way routines), strengthening competitiveness at full employment. They felt the 
pressure from grass-roots criticism of Labour’s economic policies (e.g. the Dala riot). 
The party expected LO to accept a restrictive fiscal policy and wage-moderation to 
avoid overheating. Thus, LO ambivalently switched back and forth between furious 
attacks on the government and declarations of loyalty. 
Sweden had strong overheating both in 1989 and 1990. At the peak — the first 
half of 1990 — the Swedish Labour government began to worry about rising wage 
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costs, loss of market shares, high inflation (wage/price spiral, high rates of capacity 
utilisation) and an interest rate differential indicating expectations of yet another 
Swedish devaluation. The Labour/LO «war of the roses» culminated as the government 
tried to cool down the economy by restrictive fiscal policy. In February 1990, a 
government incomes policy proposal to freeze prices and wages, also implied a ban on 
strikes. Suggested fiscal measures were: VAT increases, some reductions in social 
security measures (e.g., no pay for the first two days of sickness), reduction in transfers 
to families. The incomes policy measures were a threat to low-paid workers in the 
public sector, who had not yet reached a wage agreement. Still, the proposal was 
initially sanctioned by the LO leadership, but strongly opposed by the Municipal 
Workers’ Union and by local units in other trade unions. A political crisis led to the 
retirement of the main architect behind the Third Way — Finance Minister Feldt — and 
to the formation of a new Labour government (Carlsson II), which presended a 
modified (no ban on strikes) package against overheating. Swedish poll data shows a 
strong decrease of support for Labour between the late 1980s and spring 1991, 
reflecting popular rejection of the marginal tax reforms, public sector cuts and 
restrictive fiscal policy. 
The Swedish response indicate two important changes: First, reductions in the 
welfare system was now a legitimate policy strategy, even for Labour. Second, the crisis 
demonstrated the much weaker position of LO, which was squeezed between the 
government’s demands for a responsible incomes policy, and the need to represent its 
members. Even in core LO unions, members now protested. 
Besides incomes policies, tax reliefs were used to raise Swedish competitiveness. 
Nominal profit taxes were scaled down from 52 to 30 percent (the general tax level), 
clearly below the OECD average. This move was justified with reference to efficiency 
and fairness. Possibilities of making tax allowances were restricted, partly to avoid 
locking-in effects. There was also other structural reforms, such as deregulations in 
agriculture and in the service sector (including local government). When the 
deregulations of the 1980s are added, it is clear that Sweden had made a system shift 
which the non-socialist parties reluctantly had to admire. But even pegging to a basket 
was not enough, as we shall see, the SEK would soon become pegged to the ECU. This 
put tough limits on incomes policies. 
Not only Sweden and Finland, but also Iceland, experienced an upturn since 1986. 
In 1985, it had become generally accepted that devaluations had created major 
difficulties for the fisheries sector, given its indebtedness and the new (high real interest 
rate) environment of the 1980s. But in 1986 and 1987, fisheries exports boomed, due to 
favourable terms of trade trends. There were concessisons designed to facilitate a 
transition to the hard currency line (1986-88) mentioned above. Relaxed controls on 
private foreign borrowing led to yet another boom in foreign borrowing. The long term 
foreign debt was in 1986 around 45 percent of GDP, exceeding total export revenues by 
almost 18 percent. The government clung to its hard currency policy, but a minor fall in 
export prices produced strong claims for a corresponding devaluation of the ISK. 
Naturally, the government lost the mid-1987 election. The new government, however,  
embarked on an even firmer neoliberal line, but had to allow devaluations in February 
and May 1988. The provisory law of May 1988 made for extremely tight incomes 
policies. By 1988-9, the conclusion for Iceland was: a failure to implement a hard 
currency policy, new monetary disorder (credit boom), and very little external 
deregulation. 
A National Reconciliation agreement (1989) involved small wage increases, 
reductions in nominal interest rates, and large reductions in agricultural prices. Behind it 
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was a new plan of reorienting Iceland’s exchange rate policy. The programme brought 
down the inflation rate from the two-digit level to around 7 percent in 1990, producing a 
negative real wage development in 1989. 
Fiscal deficits remained large, and the debt burden became increasingly difficult 
given the low growth rates of the early 1990s. This demonstrates the problems involved 
in economic policies which try to use exchange rate adjustments as growth stimuli. 
Such a policy, namely, creates the need for even stronger fiscal adjustments. 
Furthermore, there were warning signals on the fishery stocks. In early 1988, the 
government believed that only a traditional short term slack in catches was coming. 
Still, restrictive economic policies were adopted with a view to long term stabilisation. 
Catches, however, did not recover. However, the creeping ecological crisis relating to 
Iceland's fish resources cannot be discussed further here. 
 
 
Third disappointment — early 1990s 
 
We have seen that market-oriented economic policy strategies were transformed from 
the early 1980s constellation of devaluation (floating) plus internal financial 
deregulation to the late 1980s constellation of a hard currency plus external financial 
deregulation. To some extent, this implied that the other countries followed Denmark. 
In the course of the 1980s, instruments that maintained full employment had given 
rise to very high inflation. National neoliberalism had stimulated (in a rather Keynesian 
way) the economy via devaluations. To all except Denmark, full employment had been 
no problem in the 1980s. In these countries, the long 1980s upturn had even started 
from a situation of full employment. Now, there was more of a stop/go-situation: first 
fight inflation, then return to the task of securing full employment.  
 
Generalized experiences 
According to Table 1, the following problems remained: (i) high relative inflation 
(except for Denmark), mainly in the early part of the period; (ii) relatively low 
production growth; (iii) current account deficits (except in Norway, Denmark 
improving); (iv) higher unemployment, first in Denmark and Norway.  
But the main component of this third disappointment was that the implementation 
of norm-based policies did not stabilise the economies. Norm-based exchange rate and 
monetary policies, coupled with allocative efficiency reforms could not hinder the 
outburst of an economic crisis. In fact, what followed was a crisis of unprecedented 
magnitude (at least in Finland and Sweden), and marked by an entirely new feature, 
namely the interaction between a real and a financial crisis (with Denmark and Iceland 
as partial exceptions, for reasons that we shall state below). This interaction between 
real and financial crises was crucial to the disappointments of the early 1980s. 
Both the real and the banking crises were the worst in the whole OECD-area. The 
boom in finance and production was per se an important reason why the subsequent 
crisis per se became so deep, since the bursting of a financial bubble can worsen a real 
economic crisis. 
The interaction between tight economic policies and financial deregulation 
(external and internal) contained an internal contradiction in as much as the instabilities 
that followed could only be mastered by strongly interventionist policies. But such 
intervention was politically hampered by the fact that norm-based neoliberalism — 
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having grown into a political culture — preached that interventions had to be avoided.22 
As a substitute for such interventions, the exchange rate was made into an anchor.   
A main policy failure in the late 1980s was that Swedish and Finnish authorities 
managed the money market in a way which was not consistent with the capacities of the 
political system. The general public did not know how to behave in such a deregulated 
situation. Alternative options were displaced: Swedish and Finnish banks should have 
required higher reserve requirements, earlier tax reforms, higher interest rates.  
Now, we have seen that Norway and Denmark had in fact taken measures to 
contain their early crises, so the problem of non-interventionism was most marked in 
Finland and Sweden. To some extent the norm-based approach to economic policies 
implied neglect of intervention to counter overheating and asset inflation in the late 
1980s in these countries. Sweden’s fiscal stance remained expansive through to 1989, 
producing a booming economy, helping Labour to win the 1988 elections. On the other 
hand, some necessary changes in tax legislation were made, and from 1989/90, there 
was a tightening of fiscal policies. 
An interesting discussion can be raised about the emergence of a neoliberal 
approach in Finland. According to our earlier analysis, the absence of both the first and 
the second disappointment should imply that conditions were not good in Finland for 
neither the national nor the norm-based version of neoliberalism, and we have in fact 
earlier argued that neoliberalism was absent in Finland. We shall argue that 
neoliberalism did not emerge as a political initiative in Finland. One should remember 
that in the late 1980s the Soviet Union was still there, and in Finland it would have been 
more difficult than elsewhere to make neoliberalism an open political banner. Rather 
than a political movement, therefore, a sort of technocratic neoliberalism evolved in 
Finland, as the relevant ideas were gradually absorbed by policymakers, civil servants 
and central bank officials. Thus, in Finland, norm-based neoliberalism arrived as a 
political culture only after the end of the Cold War, and this happened to coincide with 
the massive economic crisis. Thus, the role of neoliberalism as a constraint on economic 
policy action was perhaps most exposed in the Finnish case. 
Finland was similar to Norway and Sweden in terms of financial structure and 
crisis. Thus, as we noted, through the 1980s, the Finnish model had become more 
Nordic, and we shll now see that it was hit by problems quite similar to the two arch-
typic Nordic countries. Finland’s fate was thus to «become Nordic» at a late stage, 
being very quickly exposed to the inherent contradictions that had been accumulating. 
Finland became Nordic just in time to take part in the crisis. 
Denmark was the pioneer in norm-based policies, having already earlier switched 
to a hard currency policy.  But the changes caused by more market-oriented policies 
were more extensive in the other Nordic countries. Thus, in the comparative discussion 
of the third disappointment below, we shall see that Denmark after a relatively mild 
crisis in the 1986-8-period in fact turned out to have less of a financial crisis than the 
others. 
The financial crisis can be seen as the end of a sequence that started in the 1980s: 
deregulation — consumption boom — asset inflation (loan-financed booms in the stock 
and real estate markets) — followed by general recession (with especially the property 
market falling), and a consequent banking crisis.  
                                     
22 Neoliberal influence denied that the political system had any problem-solving capacity at all. 
Policy makers had erroneous expectations as to the size of future production capacity. The end result was 
cuts and setbacks in the welfare state which would not have been necessary if these countries had not 
made these economic policy failures. 
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The financial sector may live its own life via reflated stock-/bond-prices, 
contagious towards the property market. This is an autonomous dynamic, but it is more 
easily released in periods of real-economic optimism. The state interventionist financial 
systems of the Nordic countries (except Denmark) had earlier barred such autonomous 
financial developments. But internal deregulation introduced a structure which allowed 
such financial instability. We have already shown that there was such an asset inflation 
process going on, nourished by the mid- and late-80s boom. In a situation with 
overexpanded balances, the cash flow must be maintained, else the bubble bursts.23 
The situation was perhaps more unstable than in the normal case in which a 
country (e.g. the U.S.) has experienced financial instability for a longer spell of time. In 
the three case countries, the structure of the regulation system was changed. The 
following asset inflation process was unique in their postwar histories. All the routines 
of the financial sector related to the earlier system with rationing. A generation of 
managing directors were used to borrow whatever they could. In the deregulated 
situation, the result was bound to be bad banking, bad management, bad risk-evaluation. 
Interest rate risk was a wholly new concept.  
Deregulation unleashed repressed demand for loans. The banks, free from the 
tutelage of the central bank and unaccustomed to operating in a market-oriented 
environment, increased their loans in a rather cavalier way and generated a boom of 
speculation and investments of dubious long-run quality. (This feature seems common 
to all the cases. Iceland is an exception, but only in the sense that Iceland already had 
experienced a series of credit explosions. Both consumption and investment booms are 
more common in Iceland.) The central bank failed to curb the banks’ loan expansion 
and to impose effective controls on the soundness of bank lending. Banks competed 
aggressively for market shares and were ready to accept dubious collaterals and to 
finance almost entirely leveraged speculative investments. The central bank neglected 
the need to control the banks’ activities, and nobody seemed to be in charge of the 
aggregate outcome. Banking interests were well represented within various public 
bodies responsible for financial supervision, and the supervising authorities did not 
enjoy sufficiently wide discretionary powers to stay well informed about the loan 
expansion, let alone to enforce effective sanctions on them. The government did not 
appreciate vigorous fiscal stabilisation. 
The inflated assets could only be reproduced if there was a constant cash flow. As 
overheating turned into crisis, the bubble of inflated asset prices burst, and the 
tightening of economic policies in the crisis started off a vicious circle. General 
deflation would secure that competitiveness was maintained in the period after 
overheating. Deflation implied an attempt to reduce all nominal prices (but wages in 
particular), so that the price level would be reduced compared to the main competitors 
in the OECD (Western Europe in particular). The aim was to increase the 
competitiveness of exports. This is always difficult. But in this specific historical 
situation, firms and households had very high nominal debts, and it was virtually 
impossible to adjust such a debt burden downwards. This is the problem of debt 
deflation, for instance: if a person is highly indebted through a mortgage loan, this debt 
will not be reduced even if her wage is halved by deflation. The situation was made 
even worse by the hard currency commitment, which by keeping the interest rate very 
high, increased the pressure on firms and households that were already in a debt-trap 
situation. 
                                     
23 Hyman Minsky, Stabilizing an unstable economy, New Haven 1983. 
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As for the crisis of the real economy, internal and external deregulation had 
resulted in huge increases in interest rates, which butchered large parts of Nordic 
businesses, spurring unemployment. This was above all so in Finland and Sweden. But 
the general background in overheating and asset inflation is similar, despite the different 
timing of the crisis in each case country. Overheating and asset inflation was a new 
feature compared with the Golden Age, which had implied structurally low interest rates 
over cycles and cyclical fluctuations in exchange rates.24 
 
 
Comparative record 
We have seen that Norway and Denmark experienced a late 1980s downturn, while 
Finland and Sweden followed the general Western European boom. The financial crises 
were similar with the real economic crisis in Finland, Norway, and Sweden. Norway’s 
real economic crisis, as showed above, came earlier, and Norwegian authorities had 
done a fair amount of adjustment when the trouble started in the banking sector (1988). 
In the cases of Finland and Sweden, the overlap and interaction between the two crises 
were more complete. 
In Denmark and Iceland, although we can trace elements of financial instability, 
there were no severe banking crises. In Denmark, internal and external deregulation had 
started earlier, and a coherent model had been established (since 1987). Iceland, finally, 
seems to have much more experience with dramatic adjustments, but the turn to a hard 
currency approach — not complete until the 1990s — implied potential dangers. 
From the autumn of 1990 (roughly simultaneous with the outbreak of the Gulf 
war), the international economy turned to a recession. At this time, for other reasons, 
the disintegration of the former Soviet economy became cumulative. Sweden was 
mainly hit by the first factor, Finland by both. In late 1990, policy makers in Sweden 
and Finland became aware of these problems. In a short time, the Finnish and Swedish 
economies moved between two extremes, from overheating to a deep recession. 
Although the crisis was milder in Sweden than in Finland, it was still much worse than 
elsewhere in the OECD area. For Finland this was the most severe economic crisis in 
the 20th century, for Sweden, the most severe since the 1930s. Attempts to tighten 
policies first got into great difficulties since there was still full employment and plenty 
of labour market bottlenecks. In Sweden, this lead to several smaller crises for the social 
democratic government, which in the end lost the 1991 elections.  
In the following, we provide a generalisation on the interaction between the real 
and financial crises for all the three countries, Finland, Norway and Sweden. There is a 
slight difference in timing, as the Norwegian crisis developed earlier (from 1988) than 
the Swedish and Finnish ones (from 1991).  
The difficult economic situation weakened the banks. High interest rates 
interacted with lower asset prices (the bubble bursting) and increasing credit losses. Let 
us start by considering consumer behavior. Declining real incomes, an increasing real 
rate of interest, and the simultaneous tax-reform forced many households to use a much 
larger proportion of real income than earlier to service debts. Even later, when the banks 
recovered from years of dramatic losses, they tended to be slow in passing reductions in 
the central bank interest rate on to the public. The governments tried to compensate by 
                                     
24 Note that de facto high interest rates in real, post-tax terms were achieved much later than when 
a higher interest rate was first launched as a policy goal! The interst rate shock reflected deregulation and 
the fact that policymakers wanted to get rid of the inflation-devaluation legacy. See also Hans T:son 
Söderström, «Ränteshocken och skuldkrisen», Ekonomisk Debatt, 1995:3. 
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various targeted credit relief schemes, but the impact of such schemes were not large. 
Most households decided to decrease their level of indebtedness, or at least not increase 
it. As a consequence, households were unwilling to make new investments in housing. 
Demand for housing declined, and so did prices. This reduced the wealth of households, 
leaving them even more exposed than before, widening the recession.  
This brings us to the behavior of business firms: the recession, together with other 
profit-depressing factors in the business sector, weakened demand for commercial 
facilities which particularly hit real-estate and construction. Repayment difficulties and 
outright bankrupcies affected banks directly and also led to reduced demand and prices 
of business property. Banks had to accept increased losses or were forced to take over 
low-price real estate items. Banks were forced to tighten conditions even for firms who 
were possibly able to survive the business cycle downturn (to some extent this was the 
case also in Norway). 
In the end, the losses were carried over to the banks. Safety fund accumulated by 
the banks (or their peak organizations), ran out quickly when problems aggravated. In 
addition, the demand slump increased problems for firms with a high debt-equity ratio. 
SMEs were hit by credit restrictions and interest rate increases. This also contributed to 
the stock market and real estate slumps. Even in Norway, in a situation in which a real 
recovery had begun, this mechanism can be traced.  
In Norway, the government’s wish to adjust towards EC-standards further 
worsened the financial crisis. In March 1991, Norwegian authorities responded to 
international influences by adopting new requirements for capital adequacy.25 Striving 
to meet these requirements in a situation of general financial crisis, banks were forced to 
slim their balances. They did this by getting rid of customers, maintaining a very high 
interest rate, that is, with a large margin between various funding costs and the interest 
rate charged from customers.  
All the most important banks were now loosing their equity capital, bringing the 
whole financial sector on the verge of collapse. Facing the danger of a complete 
breakdown of payments and credits, the governments had no choice but to rescue the 
banks by means of large cash-injections. Finland had the most serious banking crisis in 
the Nordic area. Total support to banks as a consequence of the crisis, was about 65 bio 
[mia] SEK in Sweden, and ca. 65 bio [mia] FIM in Finland. This implies that the 
Finnish crisis was graver, as the FIM exchange rate is higher than that of SEK, and the 
Finnish GDP lower than Sweden’s. Norway, by 1993, the state had spent the amasing 
amount of 20 bio NOK to stabilise the banking system (3 percent of GDP). [Better data 
to be included later!] 
                                     
25 During the earlier credit policy regime, primary and secondary reserve requirements were main 
instruments in the Keynesian «technocratic» attempts at macroeconomic fine tuning of total lending by 
financial institutions, as noted above. Such reserve requirements implied that a certain amount of total 
assets should be kept as cash or in other very liquid forms. Capital adequacy requirements, in contrast, 
requires that the capital base is a certain share of total assets. Such a requirement primarily intends to 
ensure the prudence of single financial institutions. It is not to be used as a policy variable, but as a 
«constitutional» provision to ensure stability and predictability, and thus suits a liberalised credit policy 
regime. The Bank of International Settlements in July 1988 recommended international harmonisation of 
capital adequacy requirements (8 per cent). This requirement was adopted by the EC in a December 1989 
directive. The Norwegian Ministry of Finance released similar directives in March 1991, with a first 
deadline towards fulfillment of the 8 per cent requirement by December 1991. Cf. Bankkrisen, NOU 
1992:30, p. 23 f. This policy was thus an expression of international pressure, but mediated through the 
wish to harmonise with EC developments. 
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The result was more extensive state involvement in the economy than ever 
before.26 Through their rescue of the banks, the state determined the size of the banks’ 
capital base, thus also defining an upper limit to their lending. The Ministers of Finance 
— caught in an unsolvable dilemma — kept urging the banks to lower interest rates, 
while this could only happen if the state granted them even more support, which was 
obviously impossible. The interest rate level was kept high. In Norway, this was 
particularly paradox, since the country now experienced an external surplus, while 
unemployment remained high. The fact that Bundesbank compensated for Kohl’s 
expensive policy of reunification, lifting the interest rates high all over Western Europe 
was also partly responsible.  
Why was Finland more hurt than Sweden? Three factors seem important: First, 
the disappearance of trade with the east. Second, restrictive fiscal policies. In contrast, 
Sweden had expansive fiscal policy 1992-93, although it was not planned that way. 
Finland’s banking crisis influenced lending to firms to a larger extent than in Sweden. 
Finally, let us consider the two contrast cases, Denmark and Iceland. In Iceland, 
there were elements of a crisis: Certain state funds reported losses in 1992. These 
credits had been given out for the purpose of restructuring agriculture and developing 
fish farming. Many firms and farms were on the verge of bankruptcy. Still, the 
government did not proceed to close down any of the big funds, but had them 
reorganised. Why was the Icelandic financial crisis not as devastating as the crises in 
Norway, Sweden and Finland? Trends such as growth impulses, credit explosion, and 
hyper-increases in real estate prices, were there. As we saw, there had been some 
internal deregulation. There was also strong downward price pressures (stronger than in 
the other cases). But there were important differences. First, credits were still channeled 
mainly through loan institutions. The banks only control about 25 percent of credits. 
The House Mortgage System took care of most of the volatile housing credits. Second, 
Icelandic banks seems to have had a policy of writing down lost credits all along the 
line instead of keeping hopes. In 1985, they wrote of 1.07 percent, and in 1990 1.26 
percent, while e.g. Swedish banks only wrote off 0.24 percent and 0.71 percent.27 In 
1991 alone, an average Norwegian bank wrote off 3.36 percent, and an average Swedish 
bank 2.22 percent of assets, while the Icelandic banks only needed to write off 1.12 
percent. Third, reserve requirements in Iceland were kept high, ten times higher than in 
Sweden, following the deregulation of interest rates. This was done despite protests 
from the banks, but it may after all have stabilised their economic situation. Fourth, 
Iceland was still behind the other Nordic countries as regards external deregulation, 
there is still no free flow of short-term capital. This may have saved Iceland from losses 
in connection with the international crises. Many Nordic firms and banks made 
grotesque losses in overseas transactions, possibly due to increased risks in affairs 
involving foreign agents and markets. Considering the experiences of the other Nordic 
                                     
26 In Finland, trouble for the banks started in the fall of 1991. Even larger banks followed in 1992, 
and by 1993, almost all major banks were bankrupt in real terms. Despite huge state support, the banks 
thus maintained a very strong position in the corporatist framework: The state committed itself to the 
rescue of all banks, public money were used not just to insure depositors, but also to prevent banks’ 
shareholders investment from melting away. The support scheme that was adopted may even create 
perverse incentives for banks, their debtors and their depositors to collude at the expsense of the taxpayer. 
In contrast, the Norwegian government was somewhat harsher: The shareholders of the two largest 
investment banks actually lost their investment. 
27 R. Haflidason, «Bankakreppa i Noregi, Sviithjod og Finnlandi — samanburdur vid throun mala 
a Islandi» [The Bank crises in Norway, Sweden and Finland — comparison to development in Iceland], 
Central Bank of Iceland, Fjarmalatidini, No. 1, 1993, p. 63-4. 
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countries, one may wonder if further deregulation and privatisation of the financial 
sector was a wise move. 
Denmark had even less of a banking crisis in this period. Also in Denmark, there 
was an experience of asset inflation. Denmark’s bubble in the housing market burst 
1987-88 (fairly simultaneous with Norway), and together with developments in the 
labour market, and the January 1987 tax reform, this marked completion of the potato 
cure. As noted earlier, there was instability for certain institutions (mortgage and 
insurance). De-segmentation of financial markets spurred increased competition, and 
led to overstretching on the part of certain financial institutions, as they tried to extend 
their activities by buying (expensively) into new fields. These problems seems to have 
peaked in 1989-91. But there were no major troubles in the banking sector. In Denmark, 
the financial failures were more spread over time than in Finland, Norway, and Sweden, 
and the capital base was somewhat higher. Thus banks were able to avoid direct 
government intervention through the period. Denmark had also had an earlier burst, as 
bond and property values had already slumped in the early 1980. Denmark also had 
higher reserve-requirements. Rationing was never as strong as in the other countries. 
Denmark’s financial crisis was less severe than in the other countries, and it also 
had a more narrow range of causes than in the other countries. The crisis was mild 
above all because the system being deregulated was very different from the financial 
systems of Finland, Norway and Sweden. In the case of Iceland, the original system was 
quite similar to these countries, but deregulation had not at all proceeded as far as in the 
other cases.  
Concerning the financial crashes, the comparative analysis shows that there were 
alternatives. Financial crisis was not an inevitable fate for any Nordic country. The cae 
of Iceland is particularly telling. Here the original financial system was organized in 
much the same way as in Finland, Norway and Sweden, and since deregulation had not 
proceeded as far, the crisis was avoided. As for Denmark: the main feature was a 
different point of departure, a different kind of organisation of the financial system. 
 
 
Responses 
We have seen that in 1989, the Norwegian economy was just past the bottom of a severe 
economic crisis, while the Swedish and Finnish economies were in a state of 
overheating. Iceland and Denmark, like Norway experienced crisis in the last years of 
the 1980s. Denmark was barely recognising trends towards a recovery, while in Iceland 
the crisis continued. In this situation, the EU single market programme emerged as a 
success. The impact of this new Western European integration offensive on the Nordic 
countries differed, as Denmark was an EU-member, while the four others were outside. 
Denmark thus followed the implementation of the Single European Act directly, and 
was also hooked on to the EMU/Maastricht-treaty-process. Also influenced by the 
recent demise of the Cold War security structure, the others now begun to approach the 
EU. All the EFTA-countries engaged in negotiations to establish the EEA, the European 
Economic Area (which would give them «membership» in the single market, but non-
membership in the political union). But the Nordic non-EU members also proceeded to 
apply for membership. 
In connection with the crisis package — against overheating — in the spring of 
1990 (which lead to the resignation of the Carlsson I government), Sweden’s Labour 
government announced that Sweden would apply for membership in the EU. This could 
be interpreted as a move to calm down capital markets, thereby possibly also reducing 
the domestic interest rate. In October 1990, this new attitude towards EU-membership 
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was confirmed, and a membership application was presented in the summer of 1991 
even before the Maastricht-treaty had been signed in December 1991. Still, that treaty 
put additional requirements on Sweden. 
Somewhat later, in March 1992, at the low point of the economic crisis, Finland 
applied for EU-membership. The decision related to the economic problems, and also 
the weakening of Soviet communism in the East. Finland’s position between the leading 
communist and the leading social democratic countries influenced its ideological 
climate in many ways. When the Soviet experiment lost its attraction and the Swedish 
third way was in a deadlock (also to be solved by EU-membership), Finland too would 
look westwards, to the EU. 
Unlike these two countries, Norway had applied for membership in 1972, only to 
experience fame as the first — and so far only — applicant country in which 
membership was voted down in a referendum. Since then, the question of Norway’s 
relationship to the EU had been exiled from Norwegian politics. With the start of the 
EEA-process, this question soon rose to the top of the political agenda again. The 
preparation of a new application took longer time than in the neighbouring countries. 
The non-socialist coalition government (of late 1989) broke down due to disagreement 
on the EC-question in 1990. Only after extensive discussions within the ruling Labour 
party 1990-92, the application was presented in December 1992. 
Iceland declined to negotiate for membership. Only the rather small Labour Party 
was in favour of memberhsip, while both the Conservatives, Agrarians, and Left 
Socialists were against. The main point was of course the expectation that the EU would 
not allow Iceland full control over the fisheries resources. 
There were of course elements of genuine political will among the political 
groups that favoured of EU-membership. But in Sweden and Finland, there was also the 
wish that integration would spell a way out of the difficult economic problems. This 
was not just a question of the single European market, since already the EEA-agreement 
implied extensive access to that market for most firms. Since negotiations would be 
finished after the ratification of the Maastricht-treaty, the applicants had to accept its 
scheme for an EMU (Economic and Monetary Union), a scheme which implied a 
considerable sacrifice of economic policy autonomy. 
However, such a sacrifice would only serve to bolster the line the three countries 
had already embarked on. While they had adjusted to the challenges since 1973 with 
considerable success, the crises of the early 1990s was sson as a proof of a dramatic 
reduction of their economic policy autonomy. Following the mid-1980s 
disappointments, the policy of competitiveness had been rephrased as a norm-bound 
policy, with the ECU as the external anchor. Membership in the EU would formalise 
this situation, and as members, the countries would have a say in the EU-institutions. 
Anticipation of a closer association with the EU (either through the EEA or full 
membership) were used as arguments for further deregulations. 
Denmark was a special case, already being a member. As a member, Denmark 
proved hesitant with respect to the new offensive for integration. In the first Maastricht-
referendum of June 1992, Denmark voted against the treaty, threatening the whole 
treaty which required consent by all signatories. In this situation, Labour and the 
Radical Liberals discussed with the Left Socialists (Socialist Peoples’s party), 
producing a socalled national compromise. At the EU summit in Edinburgh (December 
1992), this compromise was accepted in the form of a unilateral Danish declaration. 
This declaration excepted Denmark (1) from the third phase of the EMU, i.e. common 
European currency, (2) from the common European defence policy, (3) from the rules 
for European citizenship, and (4) from participation in internal police and justice 
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cooperation (the third pillar). It was accepted by a majority in the new Danish 
referendum of 1993. 
It was noted, ironically, that after the accession of Finland and Sweden from 1995 
(see conclusion below), these two new Nordic entrants now had stricter terms of 
membership than the older member, Denmark. (As for the setbacks in EU’s move 
towards an EMU, we provide some brief comments in our conclusion.)  
We shall now turn to economic policies, focusing particularly on efforts to 
counter the crisis.  
Norway could record relative success. The two main reasons for Norway’s 
relative success were linked to state activity: first, since 1989, the government 
embarked on very expansive fiscal policies (Table). Second, there was a boom in the oil 
sector, due to a general price increase in connection with the Gulf-war (ending in March 
1991), increased production, cost-cuts due to new technologies and increasing 
investments in this sector. Norway and Denmark were both blessed by increasing oil 
prices, but the Norwegian economy picked up earlier, due to more expansive policies. 
Norway recorded the highest GDP growth rates in the area in the early 1990s, but even 
there, the recovery came as late as 1992. Having adjusted early, Norway’s and 
Denmark’s economic development in the 1990-93-period was better than that of 
Finland and Sweden. 
In both Sweden and Finland, the governments had to tackle their worst recessions 
in decades in a situation in which interventionism (except for labour market policies) 
was ruled out. In 1991-2, the norm-based policy approach reigned.  
In Sweden, the government put its faith in structural reforms (europeanisation, 
profit-tax reductions) to affect investments and growth positively. Like earlier, there 
was no active growth policy, except for infrastructural investments in 
telecommunications and transport. Sweden used one instrument more actively than the 
Finns: Labour market policies survived under the non-socialist Swedish government. 
This is one important reason why the Swedish unemployment rate did not rise as 
dramatically as the Finnish one. Young people were given temporal jobs to get 
vocational training, while relief works were scale down somewhat. 
In Finland, the policy response to the crisis — involving a debt burden of 40 to 50 
percent of GDP — was a mix of old routines and policy innovations. There was much 
uncertainty about economic policy strategies. We have noted the procyclical tradition in 
Finnish fiscal policy and the emergence of stabilisation-orientation since the late 1970s. 
With the dramatic crisis of the early 1990s, elements of the old cameralist model of 
economic policy returned, with devaluation and procyclical policies. Finnish decision 
makers were genuinely confused. For ideological reasons they were against the 1980s 
corporatism. But the strategy of deflating wages while the economy is in a debt trap, is 
an impossible one. Thus, it was impossible to fully discard the 1980s corporatism. The 
government’s goal of keeping inflation low required corporatist incomes policies. The 
functional needs contradicted the ideological convictions. Finland was the first Nordic 
country in which the ECU-preg broke down. 
For instance, the devaluation November 14, 1991, spelled trouble for incomes 
policy negotations, indicating that the vicious circle of devaluation and compensation 
claims — so typical of the Finnish model in its earlier days — had returned. At the very 
least, the demands on incomes policies to keep down inflationary wage demands, and 
even to achieve general nominal wage cuts during depressions, had become very heavy. 
Finland’s main economic policy effort was to boost exports. Fiscal austerity led to 
decreased demand 1993-6. Economic restructuring was uneven: exports grew by 9 
percent in 1992, and this rate is expected to continue thanks to good competitiveness. At 
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the same time, the sheltered sector of the economy is plummeting. Consumer demand 
was shrinking well into 1995 [?]. This reminds of the old model: exports are boosted, 
domestic demand depressed, and public expenditure is cut. There has been no 
commitment whatsoever to keep up economic activity in the domestic sectors. Export 
growth did not reduce unemployment from its March 1993 level of 17 percent. 
In Sweden, the non-socialist, minority government came into office from Fall 
1991. Bildt’s government implemented an even stronger version of the norm-based 
policy, dubbed «The only way», in contrast to Labour’s «Third way», thereby obscuring 
the fact that already Labour had switched to a norm-based policy. The non-socialist 
Only Way had these components: (1) Fiscal policies would be kept so tight that 
voluntary incomes policies (cf. Rehnberg commission) would be unnecessary. (2) Even 
stronger priority to the struggle against inflation, despite accellerating unemployment 
and a strong reduction of the pace of inflation. (3) The planned EU-membership would 
be a more binding constraint on economic policy. The convergence-criteria of the 
Maastricht treaty — including the strong emphasis on price stability — were used to 
legitimate policies. VAT-reductions in 1992 aimed at harmonisation with EC-levels. 
Pegging of SEK to ECU had been done before the election by Labour (on May 17, 
1991). (4) Norm-based policy would also, it was argued, benefit productivity growth by 
exerting transformation pressure. The Ministy of Finance, for instance, rejected lower 
pay-roll taxes to increase the competitiveness of Swedish firms. Norm-based policy 
promised reduced nominal wage growth, higher unemployment, high productivity 
growth in Swedish plants, and the marginal tax reform.28 
As for the position of the labour market partners, SAF felt strong and planned 
(early 1990s) to refrain from participation in all the corporatist institutions of the 
Swedish model. Only LO stood to gain if SAF remained in all these public and semi-
public arrangements. SAF would rather act as a major political lobbyist. This more 
sharpened ideological climate implied fiercer attacks on the institutions of the Swedish 
model. 
LO was the only main actor which opposed the norm-based policy, advocating a 
flexible exchange rate and opposing reductions in public transfers, even under the 
Labour government. But LO also supported the policy of increasing long-run profit 
shares and profitablity, especially in the exposed sector, and remained uninterested in 
industrial policies (e.g. towards SMEs). This contributed to the weakening of LO. In 
contrast to the LO, the Metal Workers Union had been engaged in industrial policy 
matters during the 1990s, and also pleaded for a policy oriented towards SMEs. The 
Bildt government used money from the phased-out wage-earner funds (introduced by 
Labour in 1983) for basic research and to supply small and medium-sized companies 
with venture capital. 
There was a marked fall in Sweden’s relative rate of inflation in 1992, but also an 
increase in relative unemployment. Productivity growth in industry increased, largely 
                                     
28 In contrast to Finnish exporters in the forest sector, Swedish raw materials industries were not 
actively working to support the change to flexible exchange rates. The reason may be that the raw 
materials producers have a stronger position in Finland than in Sweden. Another possible reason is that 
the transformation pressure argument did influence crucial decision makers in Sweden in the early 1990s. 
If decision makers in the raw materials industries were convinced that politicians would not give them a 
new breathing-space by yet another devaluation, they felt forced to raise cost competitiveness through 
productivity increases. (Rationalisation, lay-offs, less labour hoarding, technical change.) Swedish 
multinationals benefitted less from devaluations and supported the Only Way due to its overall profile. 
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due to extensive rationalisation.29 After a long period of lagging behind the OECD 
countries, industrial productivity growth in Sweden overtook growth in most of the 
other OECD-countries in 1992-3. Competitiveness in terms of relative wage costs and 
company taxation was satisfactory towards the end of 1992, which was also noted by 
foreign investors and multinationals. However, the policy of the Only way failed in its 
main task, that is: to create confidence in the SEK. The November 1992 currency crisis 
ended in the breakdown of the hard currency strategy. 
As for the situation after the breakdown of the hard currency part of the norm-
based policy, the Bank of Sweden avoided a major British-style cut in the bank rate 
(counter-cyclical monetary policy) when floating was introduced and the SEK started to 
fall. The Swedish government feared that nominal long-term interest rates would 
stabilise above the international average, thus squeezing investments and pushing the 
SEK further down. The interest rate should be brought down gradually in train with the 
Bundesbank rate, to counter any expectations of devaluation. The hard currency norm 
was replaced by the monetary policy norm that inflation (and thus a free fall of the 
SEK) should be avoided. Only in 1993 disposable household incomes decreased. 
Depreciation of SEK worked in an expansive way. But employment effects were small 
due to uncertainty and rationalisations. New signs of recovery favoured raw materials 
industries, with few employment effects. 
There had been some elements of the old Rehn/Meidner model in the Only 
Way.30 With the «savings packages» and the turn to a floating exchange rate, these 
elements were lost. Reduced payroll taxes implied a general subsidy to profits. Floating 
rates reduced the chances of exposing the companies to transformation pressure. In one 
year the SEK depreciated by 25 percent against the currencies of the trading partners, a 
reduction as huge as the two devaluations in the early 1980s taken together. In addition, 
the government proposed in the autumn of 1993 a further reduction in taxation on 
capital and profits. More in line with the Rehn-Meidner norms, fiscal policy was 
relatively cautious, despite a deep recession.31 Monetary policy was cautiously 
expansive. Labour market policies were still ambitious, with no such policy, open 
unemployment could well have been 13 rather than 9 percent in 1993. 
Rising unemployment became a political burden for a socialist government. 
However, Labour considered reduction of the public deficit its main task, although 
claiming that its fiscal strategy was fairer than that of the earlier non-socialist coalition. 
The objective of austerity was partly to prevent overheating in 1996-7, but primarily to 
reduce long-term interest rates by deflecting expectations — in international capital 
markets — of increasing Swedish inflation. Also the Central Bank shared this 
expectation, which raised the short-term interest rate in the Winter of 1994-5. The 
                                     
29 The lack of renewal and productivity growth in Sweden’s established manufacturing firms 
during the 1980s also explains a lot of the 1990s rise in productivity. Many firms were unprepared for a 
situation of declining demand and increasing foreign competition. Rationalisations that should have been 
started in the 1980s, started only first in the early 1990s. The decline in demand was matched by a 
stronger decline in employment, and thus by exceptional productivity increased by established firms. 
30 The Rehn-Meidner model had been associated with Labour, and it is thus a paradox that the 
Only Way in fact resembled that model in many respects: tight economic policies to reduce inflation and 
promote growth, with labour market policy securing full employment. However, the Rehn-Meidner 
model was formulated for an overheated economy, not for a recession situation, it emphasised 
redistribution and full employment more strongly, and had more room for selective instruments. 
31 It was still expansive, albeit less so than in 1992. However, here we must once again emphasise 
that the Rehn-Meidner model is mainly a model for an «overheated» situation. Reformulated for a high 
unemployment situation, the model justifies more expansive fiscal and monetary policies than those of 
Sweden 1993/4. 
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Central Bank had not been able to prevent the Swedish long-term rates from rising 
clearly above the German rates in 1994. Extensive labour market programmes but could 
not prevent a rapid rise in unemployment, as these programmes were not supported by 
other fiscal policy instruments.  
Critics claimdd that the net effects on employment and inflation will be minor, 
since the program coincided with high average profitability due to devaluations and 
earlier reductions in general payroll taxes. But to some extent, Sweden did pursue a 
stabilisation policy. While the ambition may have been to tighten policies, the result 
was expansion. Despite cuts, the discretionary element in fiscal policy still generated 
expansion, and one of the main reasons must have been the generous help granted to the 
banks. However, the passive growth policy lived on. The combination of traditional 
infrastructural investments and tax relief, as well as the devaluation, would above all 
favour the traditional industrial core of the Swedish model. In contrast, r&d spending 
(real terms) was reduced by the government. It seems that the Swedish growth strategy 
is the same irrespective of all declarations of a «new» industrial structure to promote 
SMEs. 
In Denmark, the orientation towards EU increased as a consequence of the 
anticipation of the internal market in the late 1980s. There was increasing industrial 
competition from the EU and for that sake, from the whole OECD-area. While in the 
mid-1980s, there had been talk about the «vanishing productivity», productivity growth 
in Denmark picked up since the late 1980s. Increasing competitive pressure tended to 
destroy old firms more easily than it led to new activities.  
The routines in the new Danish model are: A hard currency exchange rate policy 
(EMS-link), and consequently no monetary policy; incomes policies (informal 
«negotiated economy») leading to wage-growth below the main competitors. It is 
accepted that external debt and the current account sets limit to fiscal policies. (But 
there has been a slight change of fiscal policy, a bit more active since 1993). Altering 
the exchange rate policy was out of question due to EU-membership. There seems to be 
no great controversy on any element of Danish economic policies: A return to 
devaluations seems impossible. Danish monetary policy is still — like in the Dutch case 
— heading for a quite close link to the «old» parity with the DEM. High unemployment 
was explicitly accepted. Incomes policies lead to below average wage growth despite a 
decentralisation (not to the firm level, but to 6 negotiation cartels, instead of LO/DAF-
level).  
This present Danish model recognises that there are limits to macro policies in an 
internationalised economy.32 Within these limits, there is consensus on certain goals: 
welfare goals, equality goals, and tackling of the balance problems. As compensation it 
opts for structural policies in the areas of the labour market and industry. 
In 1992, Iceland’s currency basket was reduced to three currencies only (USD, 
ECU, YEN). There was no disagreement in parliament on this principle, but the timing 
was critisized. In order to soften the credit squeeze on the fisheries sector without 
falling back on the devaluation routine, the government payed back prior in-payments to 
the equalisation funds. The new regime, however, will only be sustainable if wage-
earners are ready to adjust real wages sufficiently downwards when national income 
(particularly the share deriving from the fisheries) suffers shocks. Exchange rate 
depreciation within the ECU margins can hardly serve this role. 
 
                                     
32 Limits is here only a proxy for routine. They legitimate it as borders, but they are routines. 
There is fumbling in structural policies. 
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Conclusions 
We find three cases of continued fumbling through the 1980s and early 1990s: As for 
Norway, our conclusion is that if there was a Golden Age model, there has not been 
anything so stable since 1973. There has been sequences of fumbling, stability has just 
been sectoral. This goes for Iceland and Sweden too. Sweden’s Third Way was replaced 
by norm-based policy, but even that broke down, lasting shorter than one business 
cycle. 
As for coherent economic policy models, we find two: Finland avoids the first 
two disappointments, maintaining a constellation of coherent regimes through its 
"Scandinavian" period from the early to the late 1980s. Presently, since the onset of 
crisis in Finland, only one coherent model remains, namely the Danish one. This cluster 
of routines was established 1982-87, and still proves reasonably coherent. It involves, 
however, a high rate of unemployment. We shall not here approach the discussions of 
how high Denmark's unemployment really is. (It has been argued that it is not as high, 
since until recently, Denmark had not paid maternity leave, and furthermore, than there 
is a group of permanently marginalised people, so to say a lost generation, that should n 
o longer be included in the unemployment rate. In addition, it is argued that Denmark's 
unemployment compensation system remains among the most generous in the world.)  
We have seen that Denmark is the leading Nordic country through the last period. 
Given that unemployment has reached a higher level in all the countries, they need to 
learn from Denmark in that respect too, since Denmark is an avant garde in work 
sharing arrangements.  
Throughout the last period we discussed, two more Nordic countries joined 
Denmark as members of EU. Negotiations for all the Nordic applicant countries started 
in 1993, and agreement was reached in March 1994. Referenda took place in 1994: in 
Finland on October 16, Sweden on November 13, and in Norway on November 28. All 
except Norway voted yes to membership. 
Politically, social democracy has returned in four of the five countries. As for 
executive power, Norway had a Labour minority government since late 1990. Iceland 
and Finland had various centre/right coalitions. Denmark (to 1993) and Sweden (1991-
4) had non-socialist coalitions. By the mid-1990s, however, in all countries except 
Iceland, Labour proved to dominate. In Norway, the Brundtland government was 
unchallenged even after losing the EC-referendum in 1994. In Denmark (1993), Sweden 
(1994), and Finland (1995), Labour regained executive porwer. In the Danish and 
Finnish cases, various Labour-dominated coalition governments ruled. As none of the 
Labour parties enjoyed majority positions in parlament, the Swedish and Norwegian 
governments were minority governments.  
We have loosely indicated the coming of a third version of neoliberalism, namely 
the europeanized version. The present situation is of course ambiguous and may turn in 
various directions. One likely direction, however, is related to the fact that now three 
out of the five countries have become EU-members. If emphasis on the EMU 
convergence criteria continue to determine economic policies, we can envision such an 
EU-based, or europeanized neoliberalism. The ambiguity of the situation, however, lies 
in the fact that EU’s EMU-project in itself has encountered several setbacks since the 
European currency crises in 1992 and 1993. (This external disappointment was just 
briefly mentioned above, but it is of course more thoroughly discussed in the project's 
final report.) In any case, the developments in the mid-1990s merit the conclusion that 
the future of economic policies in the Nordic area, and possibly also of the social 
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democrats who influence these policies, are strongly dependent now on the fate of the 
EU-project. 
 
 
 
